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This paper provides new evidence on the relation between
CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking by exploiting the
change in the tax treatment of UK pensions following two
pension amendments. The 2006 pension reform introduces
the annual and lifetime allowance for UK pension schemes,
significantly increasing income taxes associated with CEO
inside debt. The 2011 allowance cut, which substantially
reduces the annual allowance introduced in 2006, further
increases income taxes on inside debt. We find that CEO
inside debt, in the form of executive pensions declines after
the 2006 reform while cash-in-lieu increases significantly.
This effect is more severe after the 2011 allowance cut
than the 2006 pension reform. UK firms appear to substi-
tute away frompensions towards cash-in-lieu,where income
taxes are less punishing. If the association between CEO
inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, we should observe
a change of risk-taking after the decline of inside debt. Our
results, which exploit the exogenous nature of the reforms,
show that the decline of CEO pensions does not lead to any
change in firm risk-taking. This result suggests that no causal
relationship exists between CEO inside debt and firm risk-
taking. Our results extend the inside debt literature, where
empirical evidence ismainly documented in theUS.Contrary
to findings in the US, our evidence suggests that the use of
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CEO inside debt is motivated to minimise income tax rather
than a tool tomoderate firm risk.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Inside debt, managerial holdings of a firm’s debt, accounts for a considerable amount of a CEO’s total compensa-
tion. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document that Fortune 500 CEOs have on average $900,000 inside debt in the
form of annual executive pension and deferred compensation, representing 10% of CEO’s total pay between 1996
and 2002. Comparable to their US data, our sample of FTSE 100 CEOs have defined benefit pensions (hereafter DB)
of £208,000 on average, accounting for 5% of their annual compensation between 2003 and 2016. Due to its sig-
nificance, there is a growing literature that examines inside debt’s effect on managerial behaviours. Edmans and Liu
(2011) theorize that inside debt could be used as an efficient tool to reduce a firm’s risk, as it makes managers poten-
tial debtholders of the firm, aligning the interests of managers with those of a firm’s debtholders. The literature finds
that managerial inside debt is positively related to various risk-averse policies (e.g., Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, & Stuart,
2012) and firm cash holdings (e.g., Liu, Mauer, & Zhang, 2014), while being negatively related to loan yield (e.g., Anan-
tharaman, Fang, & Gong, 2014) and dividend pay-out (e.g., Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, &White, 2015; Srivastav, Armitage, &
Hagendorff, 2014).1 Table1 summarises themain findingsof insidedebton firmrisk-taking in the literature. Theempir-
ical evidence overwhelmingly supports a negative association between inside debt and firm risk-taking.
In this study, we seek to re-examine the impact of inside debt on firm risk-taking. Our motivations are twofold.
First, the evidence related to inside debt and various firm policies is mostly documented in the US.2 Edmans and Liu
(2011) are very cautious about their theoretical results. They argue that the impact of inside debt on risk-taking is only
tested in the US; whether it applies in another country should be further examined.3 In a recent study, Li, Rhee, and
Shen (2018) call for extending researches of CEO inside debt from the US market to the global market.4 Using hand-
collected UK pension data, our study extends the literature by examining inside debt in a newmarket. The differences
in pension tax rules between the US and the UK lead to our new results.
Second, our quasi-experimental design provides newevidence to assess the causal association betweenCEO inside
debt and firm risk-taking. Similar to other studies in corporate finance, the endogeneity problemalso plagues research
on inside debt. To address this problem, the literature usually employs instrumental variables (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012;
Liu et al., 2014; van Bekkum, 2016). However, instrumental variables also suffer from validity and multi-endogenous
regressor problems (e.g., Gow, Larcker, & Reiss, 2016; Roberts &Whited, 2013). Another approach to mitigate endo-
geneity is a quasi-experiment, where a natural event is used to explore exogenous variations of independent variables.
1 Caliskan and Doukas (2015) find that inside debt increases dividend payout due to CEO risk aversion. They argue that dividend payout is less risky than
capital investment.
2 Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) test the relation between CEO pension and bond yield on a small UK sample. While their findings support the risk
reduction incentives from inside debt, they do not test any firm risk taking policy explicitly. Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2018) provide evidence that R&D
will decline if retiring CEOs havemore inside debts, while this is not the case for CEO of other age groups.
3 As Edmans and Liu (2011) suggest, ‘existing studies are focused on large firms in theU.S. It is not clear whether these findings are representative of all firms,
or firms overseas.’
4 As Li, Rhee, and Shen (2018) state, ‘Althoughour analyses are basedonUSdata,webelieve that an interesting avenue for future researchwould be to extend
our approach to the global debate. . . ’.
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Sundaram and Yemack (2007) US Inside debt is positively associatedwith distance to default.
Wei and Yemack (2011) US Firmswithmore inside debts experienced bond prices rise
after SEC disclosure reform.
Edmans and Liu (2011) N/A Inside debt reduces firm risk and optimal inside debt
should depend on CEO relative leverage.
Cassell et al. (2012) US Inside debt is associatedwith a variety of firm risk-averse
policies.
Anantharaman et al. (2014) US Inside debt leads to a lower promised loan yield. Inside
debt only reduces firm risk if it is a junior debt.
Kabir et al. (2013) UK Inside debt, in the form of DB pension, is negatively
associated with bond yield spread.
Liu et al. (2014) US Inside debt is positively associatedwith firm cash holdings.
Srivastav et al. (2014) US Inside debt is negatively associated with bank pay-out
policy.
Choy, Lin, andOfficer (2014) US Freezing DB leads to a higher level of total risk.
Phan (2014) US Inside debt is positively associatedwith abnormal bond
return in the event ofM&A announcement.
He (2015) US Inside debt is positively associatedwith financial reporting
quality.
Eisdorfer et al. (2015) US Inside debt is negatively associated with firm dividend
pay-out.
Caliskan andDoukas (2015) US Inside debt induces CEOs to paymore dividends.
Bennett et al. (2015) US Inside debt is negatively associated with bank default risk.
van Bekkum (2016) US Inside debt is negatively associated with variousmeasures
of bank risk.
Dang and Phan (2016) US Inside debt is positively related to short-maturity debt.
Li et al. (2018) US Inside debt is negatively related to the level of outstanding
convertible debt and probability of issuing convertible
debt.
Belkhir, Boubaker, and Chebbi
(2018)
US The value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO
inside debt increases.
Kabir et al. (2018) UK R&D spending decreases for retiring CEOwithmore inside
debts.
Cambrea, Colonnello, Curatola, and
Fantini (2019)
US CEO inside debt investing plan is depending on firm safety.
Deng, He, Kong, and Zhang (2019) China Inside debt leads to a lower level of risk-taking in banking
industry.
Sheikh (2019) US Inside debt is negatively associated withmeasures of
future risk.
Borah, James, and Park (2020) US Inside debt leads to a lower cost of debt and default risk.
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In this paper, we identify two UK pension reforms that directly affect CEO inside debt but have no apparent effect on
firm risk-taking policies. The natural experiment adds new evidence to the existing inside debt literature. Our empiri-
cal approach is inspired byHayes, Lemmon, andQiu (2012), who use the adoption of FAS 123R in theUS as the natural
experiment. Stock option usage declines sharply after FAS 123R is implemented, but FAS 123R adoption does not
directly affect a firm’s operating policy. The 2006 pension reform in the UK is surprisingly similar to FAS 123R adop-
tion in theUS. CEOpension decreases significantly after the reform, but the reform does not affect a firm’s risk-taking
policies.
Our main findings are threefold. First, we provide new quantitative evidence on the rapid decline of DB pension.
Similar to industry surveys (e.g., Lane Clark & Peacock LLP, 2015), our data show a downtrend of CEO DB pension.
After the 2006 reform, UK CEOs are less likely to receive DB pension, while more likely to be paid with cash-in-lieu.5
Our results also show the scale and timing effects of the tax reform, including the impact of a few gradual changes
in the follow-up years. Specifically, the proportions of DB pension as a fraction of pension are 27.38%, 24.06%, 57.5%
and83.02% lower in the reformpendingperiod (betweenAugust2004 toMarch2006), the reform introductionperiod
(April 2006 toMarch 2011), a big allowance cut period (April 2011 toMarch 2014) and a further allowance cut period
(after April 2014) respectively, compared to that in 2003. On the other hand, cash-in-lieu as the fraction of pension
increased by 28.98%, 71.10%, 120.39% and 134.79% in corresponding periods. The effect was more pronounced in
2011 (when annual allowance is cut down further) than itwas in 2006. Theperiod has the largest decline inDBpension
and the highest increase in cash-in-lieu. Besides, we find that CEOs with high DB pension prior to the 2006 reform
show a larger reduction of DB pension after the reform.
Second, our results are indicative that the sharp decline of DB is driven by the tax saving (of CEOs’ income taxes)
rather than a simple cost reduction practice (to cut employers/firms’ pension expenses). DB pension is known to be
in decline since the 1990s (Broadbent, Palumbo, & Woodman, 2006), due to its high cost. Firms have been shifting
DB to defined contribution (hereafter DC) pension to reduce pension expenses for almost two decades. However, the
accelerated decline of DB in recent years was primarily driven by the 2006 tax reform. If the recent decline of DB is
caused by firm cutting costs, we should also observe an increase in DC pension. In contrast, our results show that DC
pension stayed almost constant after the 2006 pension reform and started to decline after the annual allowance was
further cut in 2014. There is a clear shift from DB to cash-in-lieu, rather than from DB to DC. The reformmakes both
DB and DC pension tax inefficient, while cash-in-lieu becomes the optimal form of pension. The result confirms our
tax benefit hypothesis that pension is a tool for tax optimisation. Firms alternate the form and level of CEOs’ pension
once tax on pension changes. Our result is also in line withMurphy (2012) who argues that ‘government intervention
into executive compensation—largely ignored by researchers—has been both a response to and amajor driver of time
trends in CEO pay’.
Our final finding is that the change of CEO DB pension after the reforms does not lead to any change of firm risk-
taking. DB pension is a form of inside debt as its payoff depends on the survival of the firm. If the relationship between
inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, then a change of CEO DB pension after the reform should lead to a change
in firm risk-taking. However, we do not find a corresponding change in firm risk-taking after the decline in DB pen-
sion. Previous studies suggest that executive compensation and corporate governance are important determinants of
a firm’s risk policies (e.g., Dutordoir, Strong, & Ziegan, 2014). Hence, we consider the market measure of risk-taking:
firm total risk (stock return volatility) and three policies with risk implications: cash holdings, R&D and CAPEX.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we first employ differenced cross-section regressions (Hayes et al., 2012)
using the pension reforms as the exogenous shocks, which provides new evidence on the causal relationship of inside
debt and risk-taking. Since our results differ from previous studies in the US, we test conventional designs that are
widely used in the literature, firm and CEO fixed-effect models. To further address the endogeneity problem, we
employ 2SLS with CEO age as the instrumental variable which is also widely used in the compensation literature.
5 The LCP FTSE 100 Executive Pension Survey 2015 also documents that recently UKCEOs are paid with a lower level pension in exchange for a higher level
of cash compensation, namely cash-in-lieu of pension.
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Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by zero value observations, asmanyCEOsdo not have any inside debt,
we employ two additional models. First, we run the fixed-effect models excluding observations that have zero inside
debt (Cassell et al., 2012). Second, we re-run our previous regressions using a DB dummy instead of a continuous DB
variable to ensure that our results are not biased by zero values (vanBekkum, 2016). Overall, our findings suggest that
there is no causal relationship between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. The risk reduction hypothesis of CEO
inside debt does not hold in the UK.
Our results on inside debt are not consistent with those in the US. There are two possible explanations. First, the
risk associated with CEO pension can bemanaged or circumvented. An underlying assumption of executive pension is
that top managers can only access it when they reach their retirement ages. In such a circumstance, pensions gener-
ate risk-averse incentives for CEOs. However, UK top managers have several options to shield this risk. One of these
options is the earlywithdrawal of pension. Typically, pension access age is 55 in theUK, but earlywithdrawal is possible
depending on the rules of pension schemes. An unapproved pension scheme can also be structured to allowearlywith-
drawal (Goh & Li, 2015). For instance, Richard Solomons, CEO of InterContinental, withdrew his entire DB pension of
£2,958,000 when he was 53 in 2014.6 While early pension withdrawal is not a common practice due to its punishing
tax,7 it undermines the seniority assumption of a firm’s outside debt.8 Early withdrawal of an entire pension would
make CEO inside debt more senior or completely secured. Another option is transferring CEO pension to a separate
andmore secure pension scheme. For example, Michael Geoghegan, director of HSBC, transferred his entire DB pen-
sion of £12,918,000 from his employer HSBC to an independent pension scheme in 2006.9 After the transfer, a CEO’s
DB pension no longer depends on his or her firm’s survival, effectively shielding the CEO from a firm’s default risk.
The second possible explanation is that a pension is a tool for optimising CEOs’ income taxes, which has little to
dowith firm risk-taking. The fact that firms substitute away from pension towards cash-in-lieu suggests that firms are
concernedwith tax effects on CEO compensation, but are relatively unconcernedwith risk incentives provided byDB
pension. The widespread use of Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (hereafter SERPs) in the US is mainly due
to their favourable tax treatment. The Internal Revenue Service (hereafter IRS) explicitly supports the use of SERP to
defer income tax on pension contribution, and there is no limit on the number of deferrals. On the other hand, the use
of Employer-Financed-Retirement-Benefit-Scheme (hereafter EFRBS), the equivalent of SERP in the UK, is rare (Goh
& Li, 2015). This is becauseHerMajesty’s Revenue andCustoms (HMRC, theUK tax authority) imposes strict rules for
EFRBS, deliberately preventing it fromworking as a tax evasion tool.We discuss tax rules differences between the US
and the UK in Section 2. If CEOs employ pensions to minimise income tax, then the pension’s role in firm risk-taking is
negligible.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First and most importantly, we address CEO inside
debt from a new angle by looking at the income tax of pension. The previous literature tends to explain the use of CEO
inside debt from the point of view of corporate tax (e.g., Anantharaman& Lee, 2014; Chaudhry, Au Yong, &Veld, 2017;
Chi, Huang, & Sanchez, 2017; Gerakos, 2010). Studies have found that DB pension leads to corporate tax saving. In
addition to corporate tax, we argue that income tax plays a vital role in determining CEO pension. Taking advantage
of detailed disclosure in tax allowances and executive pension in the UK, we are able to identify individual CEOs’ tax
treatment in their pension scheme for a given tax year. This paper highlights the importance of income tax in deter-
mining CEO compensation.
Our second contribution is to use a natural experiment approach to provide new causality evidence of inside debt.
By employing the differenced cross-sectional estimation around the 2006UKpension reform and the 2011 allowance
cut (two exogenous events), our research method provides an alternative control to the endogeneity problem that
6 See InterContinental Hotels Group plc Annual Report 2014, p. 82.
7 Withdrawing pension gradually over many years will result in significantly less income tax. More details about tax on early pension withdrawal is available
at: https://www.gov.uk/early-retirement-pension/personal-and-workplace-pensions
8 This is also true in the US. Based on data from Execucomp, there are 11 (out of 1,744) CEOswhowithdrew the full balance of their inside debt in 2014.
9 See HSBCHoldings plc 2006 Remuneration Report, pp. 286–7.
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affects many studies in corporate finance. This paper also enriches the executive remuneration literature by using
regulation change as an exogenous shock to assess the causal relationship betweenmanagerial pay and firm policies.
Our third contribution is providing new evidence of inside debt outside the US. Although DB pension is not unique
in the US, most studies are US-based.10 Our study of CEO inside debt in the UK is a direct response to the previous
literature, such as Edmans and Liu (2011) and Li et al. (2018), which explicitly calls for extension of the US study to
other countries. OECD (2019) shows that over the last decade (2008–18), 17 out of 22 reporting countries witnessed
a significant decline of DB pension. If the decline of DB pension is universal across the globe, what are the impacts on
firm risk policy? Our findings provide an answer to the question. In short, our paper offers new implication for other
countries, where DB pensions are also in sharp decline.
2 EXECUTIVE PENSION IN THE UK
2.1 Tax treatment in the US and the UK
We first discuss the tax treatment of executive pension in the US and the UK. In the US, firms can grant pensions to
their CEOs in two ways: tax-qualified pension plan and non-qualified pension plan. A qualified plan, usually taking the
form of 401(k), is a DC pension plan that is available to every employee. Contribution to 401(k) plans is tax-free up
to an annual limit, which is set at $19,500 in 2020. Contributions beyond this limit are possible but subject to income
tax. Non-qualified plans, usually taking the form of SERPs, are pension plans that are specifically designed to reward
top managers. SERPs are very popular in the US because CEOs do not pay income tax on any contribution immedi-
ately as long as the SERP is unfunded and unprotected. Tax deferral allows CEOs to accumulate pensions at a pre-tax
return rate. Since SERPs are usually non-qualified, they provide firmswith certain flexibility on how to structure them.
Unfunded non-qualified plans are designed to be tax efficient and are publicly recognised by the IRS.11 Since there
is no limit on the amount of contribution, SERPs are usually used to top up executive pensions once CEOs exhaust
their limits in 401(k).While CEOs still pay taxeswhen they start receiving retirement benefits, many options to reduce
income tax are available. For example, CEOs canmove to a state where there is a lower state income tax rate.
Similar to CEOs in theUS, a typical UKCEO receives pension from two sources: tax approved pension schemes and
unapprovedpension schemes. Tax approved schemes usually take the formof occupationalDCorDBpension schemes
and function almost identically to 401(k) plans in the US. CEOs can make tax-free contributions up to a specific limit
into the scheme. In the 2020–21 tax year, the annual tax-free limit for pensions is £40,000. Unapproved schemes in
the UK, on the other hand, are quite different from non-qualified plans in the US. Contributions to unapproved pen-
sion schemes do not attract any tax relief in the UK, and they are also subject to the annual contribution limit. Unlike
SERPs in the US, income taxes on pension contributions are not deferrable in the UK.12 HMRC specifically states that
unapproved pension schemes are not tax evasion tools.13
In short, the main difference in tax rules between the UK and the US is the income tax deferral. Since UK CEOs
cannot defer income tax on pensions, it is expensive to award CEOs with pension directly. As our results will later
show, firms are increasingly replacing executive pensions with cash-in-lieu. In contrast, SERPs are very popular in the
US because of their tax efficiency.
10 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2013) reports that 18 out of 35 OECD countries provide DB pension for all pub-
lic sector workers, while private (occupational) scheme of DB pension is mandatory or quasi-mandatory in three countries: Iceland, the Netherlands and
Switzerland.
11 See IRS Technical Guidelines for Employment Tax, available at: https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-023-005r-cont01.html#d0e1980
12 Special unapproved schemes, such as the Employer-Financed-Retirement-Benefit-Scheme (EFRBS) can be set up to evade the contribution limit, but the
scheme is overwhelmingly complex and quite costly to operate. Its uses were not widespread before 2011 AA reduction (Goh & Li, 2015).
13 See ‘Tackling disguised remuneration avoidance schemes’, technical note at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tackling-disguised-
remuneration-avoidance-schemes-overview-of-changes-and-technical-note/technical-note
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2.2 The 2006 UK pension reform
In the UK, a series of tax rules were introduced in April 2006. The new rules intended to replace complicated tax
regimes that govern different categories of pension schemes. The most notable feature of the reforms was the intro-
duction of annual allowance (hereafter AA) and lifetime allowance (hereafter LTA), which limits the amount of pension
income/contribution that is tax deductible. TheAA limits tax reliefwhen funds allocate/contribute to a registered pen-
sion scheme. It caps the amount of pension contribution that is tax-free for a given tax year. Any amount of pension
contribution beyond AA is taxed as regular income. On the other hand, LTA limits tax relief when the employee (or
pensioner) begins to receive a pension benefit. It caps the total pension amount that can be drawn from registered
pension schemes without triggering an extra tax charge. Any pension benefit received above this limit will be subject
to additional tax.
In the pre-2006 era, applying tax relief to pension contributions was very complex, involving adding up contribu-
tions under different tax regimes. The AA simplifies this process and puts a total limit on all contributions to all regis-
tered pension schemes. Since similar but more complicated tax relief was already in place before the 2006 reform, it
is not clear how AAwould affect top managers’ pay.14 The AAwas £215,000when it was first introduced in 2006 and
was still very generous compared to the Earnings Cap in previous years. Table 2 presents Earnings Cap, AA and LTA in
the UK from 2003 to 2019.
Before the introduction of LTA, topmanagers paid income taxwhen they started receiving pension benefits, usually
at the top income tax rate.15 Since 2006, there has been an additional charge if their total pension benefits are paid
over LTA. Excessive withdrawal of pension over LTA would trigger a tax charge of 25% if it is taken as an income, or
55% if it is taken as a cash lump sum. EFRBS can be set up to avoid both AA and LTA, but HMRC introduces new rules
to address special vehicles that are deliberately set up to avoid taxes. EFRBS is also very costly to operate. Therefore,
the use of EFRBS in the UK is not as widespread as SERPs in the US (Goh & Li, 2015).
In short, the 2006 UK pension reform has significantly increased income tax associated with pension. CEOs with a
large amount of pension would incur extra tax when their pensions exceed either AA or LTA.
2.3 AA reduction in 2011
SinceAAand LTAwere introduced in 2006, AA and LTAhave been reviewed annually in the government budget. These
changes were small and gradual. However, in 2011, AA was slashed from £255,000 to £50,000. After this cut, the
amount of allowance available for tax reliefwas dramatically reduced.While the change is small in termsof complexity,
the amount of tax relief involved is substantial. After the reduction, AA is only one-fifth of its original amount in 2010.
CEOs who do not exceed pension allowance in 2010 could face an income tax charge at 40% from 2011, even though
their pension incomes have not changed at all. We also call the 2011 allowance cut a big reduction in AA and a big cut
in allowance (or AA change) in later sections.
14 For example, before 2006, tax reliefs on pension contributions are offered on a percentage basis, usually at 15% of pensionable income and subject to an
Earnings Cap (which was later replaced by AA and LTA). Given that the Earnings Cap in the 2005–06 tax year was £105,600, themaximum tax-free contribu-
tion a CEO can put into a company pension scheme is merely £15,840 (105,600 × 15%) in that year. CEOs can use unfunded unapproved retirement benefit
scheme (UFRBS) to top up their pension contribution beyond the restriction. Since 2006, UFRBS has been renamed to EFRBS. But these additional contri-
butions do not attract any tax relief; for example, they are taxed as normal income. However, an unapproved scheme has a critical advantage: at retirement,
pension benefit can bewithdrawn as a lump sum tax-free.
15 Before 2006, annual pension benefit was limited by a maximum amount. The maximum pension was usually two thirds of a CEO’s final salary or Earnings
Cap, whichever is lower. For example, the Earnings Cap in the 2005–06 tax year was £105,600, which means the maximum benefits retired CEOs can get
from an approved pension scheme was £70,400 in that year. However, CEOs can receive additional benefits beyond this limit using unapproved schemes. As
discussed in the previous footnote, an unapproved scheme is very attractive because the total benefit can bewithdrawn tax-free. It is also a common practice
to top up a CEO’s pension based on this method.
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TABLE 2 Earnings Cap, annual allowance and lifetime allowance in the UK
Tax year Earnings Cap (pre-2006) Annual Allowance (post-2006) Lifetime Allowance (post-2006)
2002/03 £97,200 − −
2003/04 £99,000 − −
2004/05 £102,000 − −
2005/06 £105,600 − −
2006/07 £108,600 £215,000 £1.50m
2007/08 £112,800 £225,000 £1.60m
2008/09 £117,600 £235,000 £1.65m
2009/10 £123,600 £245,000 £1.75m
2010/11 £123,600 £255,000 £1.80m
2011/12 £129,600 £50,000 £1.80m
2012/13 £137,400 £50,000 £1.50m
2013/14 £141,000 £50,000 £1.50m
2014/15 £145,800 £40,000 £1.25m
2015/16 £149,400 £40,000 £1.25m
2016/17 £150,600 £40,000 £1.00m
2017/18 £154,200 £40,000 £1.00m
2018/19 £160,800 £40,000 £1.03m
2019/20 £166,200 £40,000 £1.06m
Notes: This table reports information for the pre-2006 pension allowance—Earnings Cap and the post-2006 pension
allowances—annual and lifetime allowances in the UK. Earnings Cap determines annual contributions that can be made into
a pension scheme without incurring any tax. It also determines the maximum amount a pensioner can receive from his/her
pension scheme. Earnings Cap is replaced by Annual Allowance and Lifetime Allowance after April 2006.
Source: HMRevenue &Customs pension taxmanual: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/pensions-tax-manual
The 2006 pension reform and 2011 allowance cut are so influential that many stakeholders are affected. Its
effect is still valid today. For example, survey data from Lane Clark & Peacock LLP (2015) show that salary supple-
ments in lieu of any pension provision continue to grow after the 2006 reform. In 2015, 38% of FTSE 100 exec-
utives used cash as an alternative to pensions. They call the phenomenon of shifting pensions to cash-in-lieu ‘the
end of the road for executive pensions’. On the other hand, the reforms generated huge tax revenue for HMRC.
According to Pension Policy Institute (2016), tax receipts on pensions reached £13 billion in 2015, a 60% increase
from 2002 thanks to the introduction of tax allowances. The reform has also accelerated closure of DB pension
schemes across the UK, as this could lower pension liability and improve firms’ financial standing. For example, Rauh
(2006) documents that firms reduce capital expenditures in response to a reduction in internal resources caused by
mandatory pension contributions. The reform also affects pension funds. Too rapid growth in pension assets (e.g.,
exceeding allowance) may result in disadvantaged tax treatment or the so-called ‘penalty for good performance’. Pen-
sion funds need to structure new tax-efficient investment plans for their members. Finally, the pension reform has
ignited several ongoing debates. A key argument is that AA and LTA undermine pensions as a long-term saving vehi-
cle. Steve Webb, the UK’s pension minister (2012–15), had suggested that frequent LTA reductions have created
uncertainty in long-term financial planning and have undermined people’s trust in long-term savings (Royal London,
2016).
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3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Tax benefit hypothesis
CEOs may favour pensions over other forms of compensation for two reasons. First, pensions are similar to salary,
which is independent of any firm performance measures. A higher level of pension inflates a CEO’s non-contingent
pay. Goh and Li (2015) document that pension works as a substitute for performance-based compensation, especially
bonuses. They suggest that CEOs take advantage of pensions to lower pay-performance sensitivity. Second, pensions
have tax advantages compared to other forms of compensation. Income tax on pensions is usually deferred, or even
free if pension contributions are below specific tax allowances. Firms and CEOs have strong incentives to take advan-
tage of pensions to maximise CEOs’ take-home pay and also minimise firms’ compensation expenses. However, the
introductionofAAandLTAafter the2006pension reformsignificantly increases the income tax thatCEOshave topay.
In our sample, 81% of FTSE 100 CEOs with DB pension either exceed AA or LTA between 2003 and 2016. Depending
on their overall income, the highest tax rate could reach 55% after the reform. This significantly reduces the attrac-
tiveness of pension as a form of tax-efficient compensation.
Tax is an important consideration when firms make decisions related to CEO compensation. A small but growing
literature is investigating the impact of tax on CEO compensation. For example, Widdicks and Zhao (2014) show that
option exercise behaviours are affected by different tax rules. They find different compensation practices in the UK
and the US are driven by the different tax treatment of CEO stock options. Focusing on CEO inside debt in the US,
Chaudhry et al. (2017) document that firms are using DB pension deficit to achieve corporate tax savings. Their study
indicates that firmsmaymanipulate pension value to obtain benefits from corporate tax.
In our UK pension case, we argue that if top managers (firms) use pensions to evade income tax (reduce expenses),
they should alternate the form and level of pension payment once tax rules change. Due to the complexity of pension
tax, a direct comparison of income tax before and after the 2006 reform is very difficult and could distract the focus
of the paper.We provide a simple demonstration in Appendix C. Overall, income tax on pension increases significantly
after 2006 as AA and LTA offer less tax relief than rules based on the pre-2006 Earnings Cap.
Firms are also willing to pay CEOs with cash-in-lieu instead of pension, as the same amount paid in cash provides
CEOswithmore net pay. In otherwords, minimising CEO income taxes also reduces expenses as firms could payCEOs
with a lowered gross amount. Yet CEOs still receive the same amount of after-tax pay. This leads to our tax benefit
hypothesis. We expect a significant decline in both DB and DC pension, while a sharp increase of cash-in-lieu as the
substitute. Our specific hypothesis is listed as follows.
H1: After the 2006 pension reform, CEOs receive fewer defined benefit (DB) pensions, fewer defined contribution (DC)
pensions, andmore cash-in-lieu of pensions.
The AA and LTA are reviewed annually by the UK government. In 2011, AA decreased to £50,000 from its high-
est level of £255,000 in the previous year. In 2014, AA was slashed further to £40,000. Therefore, we expect that the
change in 2011 is more severe than the introduction of AA and LTA in 2006.While the 2006 reform completely over-
hauls pension tax rules, tax reliefs from the new rules were still generous in some areas. For example, a CEO only pays
an AA charge when his or her annual pension contribution is above £255,000, which is a generous amount even in our
sample of FTSE 100 CEOs who have a mean pension of £204,000. More than half of the CEOs in our sample would
not pay an AA charge before 2011 but would have to pay an AA charge of 40% on the same pension contribution
afterwards.
Another important aspect of the 2011 AA reduction is that the change was not expected. All pension allowances
are reviewed and amended in the UK government budget every year. In the April 2009 budget, AA was set to be held
constant at £255,000 until 2016. However, in the June 2010 budget, HM treasury took a complete U-turn on the
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pension tax andplanned to reduceAA from £255,000 to £50,000.16 This changewas unexpected by the pension indus-
try. Our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Compared to the 2006 pension reform, the annual allowance (AA) reduction in 2011 leads to a larger reduction
of defined benefit (DB) pensions and defined contribution (DC) pensions, but a larger increase in cash-in-lieu of
pensions.
3.2 Risk reduction hypothesis
The US literature unambiguously documents that CEO inside debt encourages risk-averse behaviours. The theoreti-
cal argument is that inside debt, such as DB pensions, makes CEOs potential debtholders. In the event of bankruptcy,
CEOs suffer considerable losses as they may not recover the full value of their DB pensions. As a junior debtholder of
a firm’s asset, a CEO is not the first in the queue to claim a firm’s residual value. Both the US and the UK governments
set up related schemes to guarantee pension payments to some extent. However, these guarantees offer limited pro-
tections to CEOs with a large amount of pension. In the US, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) could
fund pension deficit when employers go bankrupt, up to a maximum limit of $64,432 per beneficiary in 2017 if the
employee is retired at the age of 65. In theUK, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) provides a similar guarantee against
employer bankruptcy, capping at an annual payment of £41,461 after April 2020. In our sample of FTSE 100 CEOs in
2003–2016, the average DB value is over £1.6million. Therefore, a large proportion of UKCEOs’ DB pension remains
exposed to firms’ default risk.
As CEOs’ wealth is tied to firms’ future financial health, CEOs are likely to take less risks and adopt conserva-
tive policies. For example, He (2015) notes that a large amount of inside debt is associated with high-quality finan-
cial reporting. Eisdorfer et al. (2015) find that firms with more inside debts pay fewer dividends. Cassell et al. (2012)
observe that inside debt is associated with a number of risk-averse firm policies (e.g., low leverage and R&D). All
these findings utilise accounting-based measures to capture firms’ risk-taking choices. They directly observe firms’
risk-averse policies. Inside debt is also negatively associated with market-based measures of firm risk. For example,
Bennett, Güntay, andUnal (2015) find that inside debt is negatively associatedwith bank default risk.Wei and Yemack
(2011) document bond prices rise in firms with high CEO inside debt after SECmandate inside debt disclosure. Anan-
tharaman et al. (2014) find that inside debt leads to low loan yield. In more recent studies, the effect of inside debt on
risk-taking is documented as conditional. Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2018) show that CEOs cut R&D spending
if they have more DB pensions and shorter career horizons. Li, Lin, Sun, and Tucker (2018) provide evidence that the
relationship between inside debt and corporate conservatism is mostly for non-investment grade firms.
Overall, the findings in the literature are consistent: inside debt is associatedwith a number of risk-averse firmpoli-
cies as well as various market measures of firm risk. Table 1 provides a review of the literature on inside debt and risk-
taking. These findings have profound policy implications as compensation reforms concentrate exclusively on equity
and other incentive pay. CEO pension and its risk-averse effect are often overlooked. Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
even argue that firms award CEO large equity to counteract conservative incentives of large pension.17 These find-
ings suggest another possibility for future compensation reforms. For example, the UK Remuneration Code and the
EU bonus cap were introduced in the aftershock of the credit crisis. The aims of these two reforms are limiting bank
CEOpayandbank risk-taking, but neither reformhas any rule related to theexecutivepensionwhich couldbeaneffec-
tive tool to curb bank risk-taking. While studies in the US are abundant, evidence of inside debt in another country is
16 The 2009 budget for UK government is available at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407203659/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud09_
completereport_2520.pdf. The 2010 budget for UK government is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-june-2010
17 As stated in Sundaram and Yermack (2007): ‘It is possible that the large equity awards Welch received in his final years in office were partly intended to
counteract the incentives for conservativemanagement that would otherwise have arisen from his large pension value.’
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scarce. Confirming evidence outside the US is important, as inside debt could offer a new instrument to policymakers
in those countries.
We closely follow the literature from the US tomotivate risk reduction hypothesis for three reasons. First, pension
regulations are quite similar and comparable in the UK and the US. As we have discussed in Section 2.1, the 401(k)
plan in theUS is almost identical to an approvedDCpension scheme in theUK. SERPs in theUS are also very similar to
approvedDBpension schemes in theUK, though their tax treatment is different. Second, the implicit role ofDBon firm
risk is comparable in the UK and theUS. DB is not a secured benefit for CEOs and sponsors are liable to pay the deficit
of DB pension in both countries. In the event of firm bankruptcy, capped protections for DB pension are provided by
governments in both countries. Third, previous literature also employs the same risk implications for UK studies. For
instance, Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova, 2013, 2018) find that CEODBpension provides risk-averse incentives in the
UK, which is consistent with the US literature.
Following the literature, we also expect a negative association between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. Our
empirical test utilises the 2006 pension reform and 2011 allowance cut as natural experiments. If inside debt and
firm risk policies are causally associated, then we should observe an immediate change of firm policies following the
pension reform. That is a decline (increase) of DB pension would lead to a higher (lower) level of firm risk-taking. Our
main risk reduction hypothesis is as follow:
H3: If CEO defined benefit pensions (DB) and firm risk-taking are negatively associated, then the change of firm risk-
taking should be negatively related to the change of CEODB pension after the pension reform.
We first consider two firm policies with risk implications: R&D and CAPEX. Both research and development (R&D)
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are risky firm policies due to their uncertainty and timing of expected payoff. Cassell
et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that R&D andworking capital are negatively associated with CEO inside debt
in the US. Similar to their study, we expect a negative association between R&D, CAPEX and CEO DB pension in the
UK. If the 2006UKpension reform led to a decrease inDBpension, we should observe an increase of R&DandCAPEX
after the reform.
Apart from accounting-based measures of firm risk, we also examine market measures of firm risk-taking. Stock
return volatility is a proxy of a firm’s total risk. A large return volatility implies a high level of risk. Based on the risk-
averse argument, van Bekkum (2016) documents that a high level of CEO inside debt leads to a low level of risk for
US banks. He considers stock return volatility along with other risk proxies, including value at risk (VaR) and expected
shortfall (ES). Following Cassell et al. (2012) and van Bekkum (2016), we also expect a negative association between
stocks return volatility and CEODB pension in the UK.
We also examine the association between cash holding and inside debt. Since firms hold cash for various reasons
besides risk aversion, we need to look further at how inside debt could interact with firm cash holdings. The previ-
ous literature identifies several motivations for a firm to hold cash: (1) transaction needs (e.g., Miller & Orr, 1966);
(2) precautionary needs (e.g., Han & Qiu, 2007); (3) tax-saving needs (e.g., Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007); and
(4) agency self-interests (e.g., Harford, Mansi, &Maxwell, 2008). In addition to those theories, we argue that CEODB
pensions also provide incentives for firm cash holdings.
First, DB pension is a risky and unsecured pay component thatmakes CEOs potential debtholders. There is a grow-
ing literature that examines the relationship between risk and cash holdings from debtholders’ points of view. For
instance, Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) document that a firm is more likely to accumulate a higher level
of cash reserve if it faces a higher level of default risk. Harford, Klasa, andMaxwell (2014) find that a firm ismore likely
to increase cash holdings and save cash from operating cash flows if it has a higher level of refinancing risk. CEOswith
DB pension are potential debtholders of their own firms. They aremore likely to hold cash if they have a large amount
of DB pensions, which is in linewith the interests of debtholders who prefer cash for security. Consistent with this risk
aversion argument, Liu et al. (2014) document that cash holdings are positively related to CEOs’ inside debt in the US.
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Second, cash is themost liquid asset to fund anyDBpension deficit. Since the introduction of the PensionAct 1995,
UK firms have a legal obligation to pay DB pension deficit within a pre-specified period. When a firm fails to meet its
statutory funding objective, the UK pension regulator has the power to issue a contribution notice, financial support
directions and restoration orders. In other words, firms with a significant pension liability are under pressure to raise
sufficient cash to fund the DB pension deficit.
Liu et al. (2014) argue that a high level of cash holdings indicates a conservative firm policy.18 Cash holdings help to
fund DB pension deficit, easing the concern of pension safety. We expect a high level of firm cash holdings for a large
DB pension size. That is a decline (increase) of firm cash holdings when CEOs’ DB pensions are lowered (increased). If
theUKpension reforms lead to a decrease inDB pensions, we should observe a drop in cash holdings after the reform.
Our specific hypothesis is as follows:
H4: If CEO defined benefit pensions (DB) and firm cash holdings are positively associated, then the change of firm
cash holding should be positively related to the change of CEODB pension after the pension reform.
4 RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 Test tax benefit hypothesis
According to the tax benefit hypothesis, we expect a significant decline in DB and DC pensions, coinciding with a
sharp increase of cash-in-lieu after the 2006 UK pension reform. Although the reform became effective in 2006,
AA and LTA are reviewed annually, so gradual changes in tax allowances are still slowly introduced. For example,
even though AA was reduced substantially in 2011, it was further reduced in 2014. For this reason, we expect
pensions to continue declining long after 2006. Furthermore, discussions of the 2006 reform started in 2001 and
were then amended several times during the consultation period until it was finalised in 2004. Therefore, we expect
some changes of pension arrangements to occur before 2006. Table 3 presents a summary of the reform timeline
below.
To fully examine the impact of the reforms and investigate the effects of the gradual reduction of tax allowances,
the sample period is divided into five sub-periods to coincide with four key milestones of the pension reform. The
first milestone date is chosen to be August 2004, as the Finance Act 2004 was published when all details of the
pension reform were finalised. This is the date when firms were fully aware of the reform’s implementation, and we
expect them to start making anticipatory changes. The second milestone date is April 2006, which was when the
reform became effective. Naturally, we choose this date to study the impact of reform before and after its effec-
tive date. The third milestone date is April 2011 when the big cut in AA became effective. As this is a big policy
surprise, we expect a larger impact on pension arrangements. The last milestone date is April 2014, which is the
date when AA was cut further. We expect DB pension to continue its gradual decline after the 2014 allowance
cut. By testing these periods separately, we examine how CEO pensions change in response to each regulation
change. The extended testing period also allows us to examine the evolution of CEO pensions. Employing different
event windows to explore the impact of law and regulation change is common. Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008) inves-
tigate the market reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. They document that the market is sophisticated
enough to interpret and respond to legislative events surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Our model is as
follows:
18 Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) also argue that cash balance is a tool to counter weak firm corporate governance. Their financial contracting hypothesis also
predicts a negative association between inside debt and cash holdings.
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TABLE 3 Timeline of the UK pension reform
Date Event
01/03/2001 Pension tax reviewwas initiated.
01/07/2002 Lifetime Allowancewas proposed. Preliminary effective date was set for April
2004.
01/06/2003 Discussion paperwas published. Reform effective datewas delayed to April 2005.
01/03/2004 The Finance Act 2004was published. Reform effective date was finalised to be 6
April 2006.
06/04/2006 Annual Allowance and Lifetime Allowance became effective.
01/04/2009 Budget 2009: Annual Allowancewould remain at the same level until 2015–16.
01/06/2010 Budget 2010: Annual Allowancewas proposed to be reduced to
£30,000–£45,000.
14/10/2010 The UK government confirmed Annual Allowancewould be reduced to £50,000,
effective from 6April 2011.
06/04/2011 Annual Allowancewas reduced to £50,000 from £255,000.
06/04/2014 Annual Allowancewas further reduced to £40,000 from £50,000.
Pension structurei,t = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Between Aug04 to Mar06 (law pending)
+ 𝛼2Between Apr06 to Mar11 (initial introduction)
+ 𝛼3Between Apr11 and Mar14 (a big cut in allowance)
+ 𝛼4After Apr14 (a further cut in allowance)
+ 𝛼5Σ CEO characteristicsi, t + 𝛼6Σ Board characteristicsi, t
+ 𝛼7Σ Firm characteristicsi, t + 𝛼8Industryi + 𝛿i, t (1)
We expect a big change in pension arrangement to happen between August 2004 andMarch 2006 (coefficient α1).
This is because the reform is already finalised, and the two-year period was designed to give firms time to prepare
for the upcoming reform. The impact is likely to be moderate between April 2006 and March 2011 (coefficient α2)
as changes are already implemented for many firms in the prior period. Due to a big surprise in AA reduction, we
expect to find a large impact between April 2011 andMarch 2014 (coefficient α3). The difference between these two
coefficients (α2 and α3) is used to test hypothesis H2, where we expect that changes in AA reduction are larger than
changes in the initial reform. As far as the further cut in AA is concerned,we also expect a significant change after April
2014 (coefficient α4), as pension becomes even less tax efficient after a further cut in AA in 2014.
We employ a Tobit model in equation (1). As a large proportion of UK CEOs do not have any DB pension, our pen-
sion structure variables contain a large number of zero value observations. Excluding these zero value observations
would introduce selection bias as firms’ decisions to award inside debt are not random. In our sample, firms that award
inside debts to their CEOs are usually large and less risky. If we treat inside debt as censored at zero, we have a signifi-
cantly censored dependent variable in regressions. The use of a Tobit model for censored dependent variables is well
documented in compensation studies. Domínguez-Barrero and López-Laborda (2007) use a Tobit model to estimate
the determinants of personal pension plans, while Brian, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) employ a Tobit model to estimate
the determinant of CEO stock-based compensation.
For dependent variables, we consider pension structure in terms of DB, DC and cash-in-lieu. For independent vari-
ables, we use four dummy variables (α2–α5) to capture the five testing periods. To control other factors that may
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affect CEO pension type, we add CEO (age, tenure, nationality, gender and equity pay), board (CEO duality and board
independence) and firm characteristics (size, market to book ratio, leverage, profitability and stock return volatility) in
equation (1). These control variables are widely used in the CEO pension literature (e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014;
Cassell et al., 2012).We also control for industry fixed-effect but not for year fixed-effect in equation (1), as year fixed-
effect overlaps our main independent variables. The design to drop year fixed-effect is consistent with Goh and Li
(2015), who investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the UK executive pension.
In addition, we conductWald tests to examine the difference between independent variables.Wewould like to see
whether the coefficients of these four period dummies of regulation change are different. As stated in hypothesis H2,
we expect the 2011 cut in AAwould lead to a bigger reduction in CEO pensions than the initial reform in 2006.
4.2 Test risk reduction hypothesis
Wesummarise the research designs of the literature on inside debt and risk-taking in Table 4. In these studies,OLS and
firm fixed-effect models are widely used. Typically, dependent variables are proxies of risk-taking, and independent
variables are proxies of DB pension.
The literature usually assumes the following relationships between firm risk, firm characteristics and DB pension:
Riski,t = b0 + b1Firm Characteristicsi,t + b2DB pensioni,t + ui + 𝜑i,t (2)
In equation (2), Risk is a firm risk-taking proxy (e.g., cash holdings, R&D, CAPEX, and stock volatility). DB pension
is a proxy for CEO inside debt. ui are some time-invariant characteristics that are unobservable by the researcher,
which include CEO risk-aversion and outside wealth or a firm’s productivity function. Firm fixed-effect regressions
arenatural candidates to address the time-invariant omittedvariable.Himmelberg,Hubbard, andPalia (1999) propose
another approach to address the unobservable variable if we take a differenced version of equation (2) as follows:
ΔRiski,t = c0 + c1ΔFirm Characteristicsi,t + c2ΔDB pensioni,t + Δ𝜑i,t (3)
By using differenced regression, ui is cancelled out from equation (2). If ∆DB pensionit and ∆Firm Characteristicsit
are uncorrelated, the equation is well specified to identify the causal association between inside debt and firm risk-
taking. However, firm characteristics and CEO DB pension could be jointly determined. Any endogenous change in
inside debt is likely to come from (or affect) changes of firm characteristics. Therefore, the following relationship
betweenDB pensions and firm characteristics should also hold:
DB pensioni,t = e0 + e1Firm Characteristicsi,t + 𝜔i,t (4)
Since both DB pension and firm risk-taking are determined by firm characteristics, a simple OLS regression on
equation (2) would lead to a biased and inconsistent coefficient, b2. Regression on equation (3) is also problematic
as variation in ∆DB pension comes primarily from variation in ∆Firm Characteristics, as shown in equation (4). The
regression could lack the power to reject the null, as∆FirmCharacteristics are already included as control variables in
equation (3). The standard solution offered from the literature is using instrumental variables which isolate variation
of DB pension that are uncorrelated with firm characteristics (e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014). While these studies
use instrumental variables tomitigate the endogeneity problem, it does not completely remove the bias.19
19 Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) are aware of this: ‘we cannot completely eliminate endogeneity as a potential confounding factor’. Lacker and
Rusticus (2010) also criticise the overwhelming application of instrumental variables in empirical studies. They argue, in many cases, estimates from instru-
mental variables are no better than estimates fromOLS.
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To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we use a framework similar to Hayes et al. (2012), who examine the effects
of stock options on firm risk-taking. They use the implementation of FAS 123R in the US, where the regulation change
increases theaccounting cost of awarding stockoptions toCEOs, as anexogenous shock. In their study, thewidespread
decline of stock options award after the implementation of FAS 123R serves as a natural experiment.
In our setup, the pension reforms explicitly affect DB pensions but have little or no direct impact on a firm’s oper-
ating policies. Hence, the reforms serve as exogenous events for our experimental design.We perform cross-sectional
regressions on differenced variables in pre- and post-reform periods to account for the exogenous shock. Considering
the following cross-sectional differenced regression:
ΔRiski = a0 + a1ΔFirm Characteristicsi + a2ΔDB pensioni + Δ𝜀i (5)
This regression is based on time differenced variables.20 This is different from equation (4), where all variables are
first differenced. The timedifference in equation (5) is taken around thepension reforms, for instance an average is cal-
culated using observations before the reform, and another average is calculated using observations after the reform.
The difference between these two average values is the new change variable. This regression provides evidence of the
causal association between firm risk-taking and CEO DB pension. This is because, first, the time difference removes
the time-invariant omitted variable, ui, as shown in equation (2). Second, the time difference is taken before and after
the pension reform, as changes in DB pension are largely driven by the new regulation, and these changes are exoge-
nous to any firm characteristics.We should observe a statistically significant coefficient a2 in equation (5), if the asso-
ciation between inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal.
5 DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Our sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE 100 index.We exclude financial and utility firms,
as strict regulation in these two industries limits their comparabilitywith firms in other industries.We also restrict our
sample to CEOswho have tenure over one year as the previous CEO’s decisions can carry over to the newly appointed
CEO.Our sample is from2003 to 2016, covering both pre- and post-reformperiods.Our final sample consists of 1,155
firm-year observations from126 firms and254CEOs.Ourdata are comparable to Li andYoung (2016)who investigate
compensation practices of FTSE 350 firms.
We hand collect all UK CEO pension data from company annual reports. Compared to other pay components, the
estimation ofDB pension value is less straightforward. FollowingKabir et al. (2013, 2018), we use hand-collected data
from annual reports to estimate the CEO DB pension value. An example of the estimation based on the company’s
annual report is provided inAppendixB.CEOnon-pension compensation and corporate governancedata are collected
fromBoardEx. All other firm-level data come fromBloomberg.
The sample descriptive statistics are listed in Table 5. The proportions of CEOs with DB, DC and cash-in-lieu are
34%, 31% and 42% respectively. Cash-in-lieu is the most popular pension type in our sample. On average, the pro-
portions of CEO annual pension are 58%, 14% and 28% for DB, DC and cash-in-lieu, respectively. DB pension is by
far the most generous pension type. On average, CEOs hold a £1.6 million DB pension in terms of transferable value.
CEO DB pension value is 18% of his or her equity incentives value (DB to equity ratio = 0.18).21 Our sample shows
that CEOs are 54 years old with 6-year tenure on average; 40% of CEOs are non-British (Foreign CEO = 0.40); and
20 Difference-in-difference approach does not apply in our case as the tax reform is universally applied to every firm in theUK. For difference-in-difference to
work, an independent and randomconditionneeds toapply toa subset of firms. For example, Low (2009)uses geographic location (firm located inDelaware) to
distinguish treatment and control firms. Firmswhich locate inDelaware are treatment firms;while other firms are control ones.We could only use difference-
in-difference approach if certain UK firms are subject to the pension reform, while other UK firms are not subject to the reform.
21 This result is comparable to theUSCEOs. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) find that the ratio between executive pension and total compensation has amedian
value of 34% in the US.
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TABLE 5 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Q1 Med Q3 Std.
DBPension (dummy) 0.34 0 0 1 0.47
DC Pension (dummy) 0.31 0 0 1 0.46
Cash-in-lieu (dummy) 0.42 0 0 1 0.49
DB pension annual (£000s) 208 0 0 68 602
DC pension annual (£000s) 51 0 0 32 114
Cash-in-lieu annual (£000s) 101 0 0 175 237
DB/Total pension (%) 58 0 0 18 40
DC/Total pension (%) 14 0 0 8 42
Cash-in-lieu/Total pension (%) 28 0 0 46 45
Pension annual (£000s) 360 51 204 378 539
Annual compensation (£000s) 4,403 1,921 3,176 4,958 5,068
DB pension total (£000s) 1,605 0 0 1,330 3,346
DB to equity ratio (times) 0.18 0 0 0.12 0.41
DB to equity ratio relative (times) 0.64 0 0 0.28 1.93
CEO equity (£000s) 58,127 4,705 10,634 23,062 264,599
CEO age (years) 53.95 49.98 54.25 57.89 6.06
CEO tenure (years) 6.29 2.70 4.60 7.80 5.87
Foreign CEO (dummy) 0.40 0 0 1 0.49
Female CEO (dummy) 0.04 0 0 0 0.19
CEO duality (dummy) 0.03 0 0 0 0.18
Board independence (%) 68.17 60.00 70.00 77.78 11.69
Cash holdings (%) 8.52 3.23 5.99 11.10 7.74
Firm size (£m) 18,386 3,592 7,671 22,331 50,475
Market to book ratio (times) 4.15 1.57 2.76 4.84 6.91
Leverage (%) 24.95 15.07 23.88 33.98 14.56
Pension deficit (£m) −418 −292 −60 0 1,178
Operating cash flows (%) 10.88 6.75 10.00 14.05 6.15
Stock return volatility (%) 33.72 22.46 29.20 40.18 16.01
R&D expenses (%) 1.75 0 0 0.91 4.57
CAPEX expense (%) 7.82 2.13 4.07 8.36 10.18
Dividend payer (dummy) 0.90 1 1 1 0.30
ROA (%) 6.83 3.48 6.50 10.10 7.55
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,155 observations from 126 UK FTSE 100 non-financial and
non-utility firms during 2003–16. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
only 4% of CEOs are female. The vast majority of CEOs do not hold the position as chairperson (CEO duality = 0.03).
Independent directors also outnumber executive directors (Board independence= 68.17).
For risk-taking proxies, our sample demonstrates that firms have 8.52% of their total assets in the form of cash
on average. They spend 1.75% and 7.82% on R&D and CAPEX as a percentage of total sales respectively. The mean
stock return volatility is 33.72%, and 90% of our observations pay a cash dividend. In short, these characteristics are
consistent with the profile of FTSE 100 firms.
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Table 6 shows the correlations between our main variables. At the 1% significance level, CEO DB pension vari-
ables are negatively related to the variable of After April11. This fits our tax benefit hypothesis that CEODB pension
declines after the regulation change, especially after the 2011 AA cut. CEO total DB pension (DB total) is negatively
related to firm cash holdings, CAPEX and stock return volatility. These correlations are consistent with the risk reduc-
tion hypothesis for CAPEX and stock return volatility, while this is not the case for cash holding and R&D spending. In
addition, CEOs tend to havemore DB pensions if they are British and their firms have a higher market to book ratio.
6 MAIN RESULTS
6.1 The impact of pension reform on CEO pension structure
Table 7 demonstrates the impact of pension reform when other factors are controlled. The dependent variables
are three pension structure variables: DB/Total pension in column (1), DC/Total pension in column (2) and Cash-in-
lieu/Total pension in column (3). Our interested variables are those four period dummies (law pending, initial introduc-
tion, a big cut in allowance and a further cut in allowance).
First, theDBpension shows a significant decline throughout the sample period. The coefficients of law pending, ini-
tial introduction, a big cut in allowance and a further cut in allowance are−27.38,−24.06,−57.50 and−83.02 respec-
tively (column 1 in Table 7). They are all statistically significant at the 5% level. It suggests that DB pension as a per-
centage of annual pensions declined by 27.38%, 24.06%, 57.50% and 83.02% in these four periods. Considering that
the mean proportion of DB pension in our sample is 58%, a decline of 83.02% suggests that DB pension constitutes
only 9.84% (58%× [1− 83.02%]) of annual pension after April 2014.
Second, cash-in-lieu increased dramatically throughout the sample period. The coefficients of law pending, ini-
tial introduction, a big cut in allowance and a further cut in allowance are 28.98, 71.10, 120.39, 134.79 individually
+ (column 3 in Table 7). They are all statistically significant at the 1% level. It shows that cash-in-lieu as a percent-
age of annual pensions increased by 28.98%, 71.10%, 120.39% and 134.79% in these four periods. Considering that
the mean proportion of cash-in-lieu in our data is 28%, an increase of 134.79% indicates that cash-in-lieu constitutes
65.74% (28%× [1+ 134.79%]) of annual pension after April 2014.
Third, DC pension only shows a moderate decline after a further cut in AA in 2014. The coefficient of further cut
in allowance is −27.63 and significant at 10% level (column 2 in Table 7). Other period variables are not statistically
significant. Considering that the mean proportion of DC pension in our sample is 14%, a decrease of 27.63% suggests
that DC pension constitutes only 10.13% (14%× [1− 27.63%]) of annual pension after April 2014.
These results confirm a big shift fromDB pension to cash-in-lieu. As we discussed previously, only DB and DC pen-
sion are subject to AA and LTA charge. CEOs are likely to be taxed twice for holdingDB andDCpension. That is the tax
on annual contribution if it exceeds AA, and tax on access to pension benefit if it exceeds LTA. Unlike DB andDC, cash-
in-lieu is just a normal salarywith a different name, and it is taxed once as a regular income. In short, the pension is less
tax efficient than cash-in-lieu after the 2006 pension reform. We present a more detailed discussion about pensions’
tax treatments in Appendix C.
These results are not only statistically significant but also economically important. After the pension reform, CEO
pension structure is completely changed in the UK. Hundreds of millions of pounds are paid in cash rather than con-
tribution in the pension scheme for top managers in the UK’s largest companies. The result clearly supports our first
hypothesis (H1), a decline of pension and an increase of cash-in-lieu after the reform. Our results are also consistent
withMorris, Gregory-Smith, Main, Montagnoli, andWright (2015). They show a decrease in DB pension following the
2006UK pension reform.
Our second hypothesis (H2) argues that the big cut in AA allowance in 2011 has a bigger impact on pension. We
employ Wald tests at the bottom of Table 7 to examine the differences between different periods. The coefficient of
a big cut in allowance is −57.50, while that for the initial introduction is −24.06 (column 1 in Table 7). The difference
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Between Aug04 toMar06 (law pending) −27.38** 10.83 28.98**
(−2.03) (0.68) (2.03)
Between Apr06 toMar11 (initial introduction) −24.06*** 6.03 71.10***
(−2.04) (0.43) (5.69)
Between Apr11 toMar14 (a big cut in allowance) −57.50*** −24.58 120.39***
(−4.30) (−1.59) (9.03)
After Apr14 (a further cut in allowance) −83.02*** −27.63* 134.79***
(−5.74) (−1.72) (9.82)
CEO age −17.46 127.70*** 80.26***
(−0.50) (3.37) (2.77)
CEO tenure −1.73 4.50 −17.35***
(−0.33) (0.82) (−4.13)
Foreign CEO −32.99*** 27.10*** −17.12***
(−4.16) (3.24) (−2.76)
Female CEO −18.55 58.09*** 3.16
(−0.99) (3.20) (0.22)
CEO equity −2.94 0.15 1.08
(−1.40) (0.07) (0.65)
CEO duality 30.47 −33.47 −42.16**
(1.64) (−1.56) (−2.16)
Board independence −1.68*** 1.29*** −0.82***
(−4.42) (3.27) (−2.70)
Firm size 19.06*** −10.70*** −8.76***
(5.91) (−3.23) (−3.44)
Market to book ratio 0.83* 0.90* −0.37***
(1.73) (1.67) (−2.94)
Leverage 0.85*** −0.18 0.24
(3.34) (−0.65) (1.21)
ROA −0.41 0.33 −1.19
(−0.75) (0.60) (1.30)
Stock return volatility −0.11*** 0.02 0.06
(−4.13) (0.08) (0.29)
Constant −6.97 −490.36*** −223.54**
(−0.05) (−3.23) (−1.94)
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Left censored 798 794 668
Uncensored 357 361 487
(Continues)










Coefficients restriction 1 Coe. (Law pending)=Coe. (Initial introduction)
Difference in coefficients (restriction 1) −3.33 4.80 −42.12***
Coefficients restriction 2 Coe. (Initial introduction)=Coe. (a big cut)
Difference in coefficients (restriction 2) 33.44*** 30.61*** −49.28***
Coefficients restriction 3 Coe. (a big cut)=Coe. (a further cut)
Difference in coefficients (restriction 3) 25.52** 3.05 −14.40*
Notes:This table reports results fromTobit regressionsdescribing the impact ofUKpension reformsonCEOpension structure.
The sample includesUKFTSE100non-financial andnon-utility firms from2003–16. The total numberof observations is 1,155
from 126 unique firms. The dependent variables are DB/Total pension, DC/Total pension and Cash-in-lieu/Total pension in
columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The independent variables are four dummyvariables representing four periods of reform:
Between Aug04 toMar06 (law pending), Between Apr06 toMar11 (initial introduction), Between Aprl11 toMar14 (a big cut
in allowance) and After Apr14 (a further cut in allowance). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. Z statistics are reported in parentheses. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.
between these two coefficients is −33.44 (−57.5 + 24.06), which indicates that the percentage in DB pension/total
pension declines 33.44% more in the period of a big cut in allowance compared to the period of initial introduction
(coefficient restriction 2 in column 1 at the bottomof Table 7). A similar result is also observed for cash-in-lieu (column
3 in Table 7) where the coefficient difference between a big cut in allowance and initial introduction is 49.28 (120.39 –
71.10), and such a difference is statistically significant (coefficient restriction 2 in column 3 at the bottom of Table 7).
In other words, cash-in-lieu has a bigger increase in the period of a big cut in allowance compared to the period of the
initial introduction. These results strongly support our hypothesis H2which states that the 2011AA cutwould lead to
a larger reduction of DB pension and a bigger increase of cash-in-lieu than the 2006 pension reform.
As far as controlled variables are concerned, our results show that UKCEOswould havemore DB pensions if their
firms are larger and more geared, which is consistent with US studies (e.g., Sundaram & Yermack, 2007). Older CEOs
in the UKwould havemore pensions, which is also in linewith the US literature (e.g., Cen, 2010; Sundaram&Yermack,
2007). However, CEOs in theUK have fewerDB pensions if their firms have a higher proportion of independent direc-
tors, which opposes findings in the US (e.g., Cen, 2010). It may highlight the monitoring role of independent directors
in theUK. In addition, CEOnationality is a significant explanatory factor forDBpension. The proportion ofDBpension
in annual pension is 32.99% lower if a CEO is non-British. This finding is never documented in studies conducted in the
US. A possible explanation is that foreign CEO is relatively rare in the US compared to the UK.
In short, the results in Table 7 support our tax benefit hypotheses (H1–H2). That is, the regulation changes increase
income tax and significantly decrease the usage of DB pension, while they encourage the adoption of cash-in-lieu.
Compared to DB pension, we do not observe the same level of decline in DC pension. UK firms appear to substitute
away fromDB pension towards cash-in-lieu, where income taxes are less punishing.
We offer an alternative explanation to our results in Table 7 here. DB pension may decline for reasons that are
completely independent of the tax reform. Firms’ total pension liabilities could be huge. Changing firm-wide pension
policies couldmakea significantdifference in a firm’s balance sheet.DBpensions aremoreexpensive thanDCpensions
as employers have to bear the risk of longevity. Therefore, it makes financial sense to shift pension from DB to DC.
Pension Policy Institute (2003) documents such a shift in the early 2000s. It argues that the growing DB pension cost
is due to increased longevity and low investment return. Firms may close DB pension plans and shift CEO pensions
to alternative deferred compensation arrangements, simply because DB pension is too costly to maintain. Once a DB
pension scheme is closed, it may stop future contribution to the scheme. However, sponsors are still liable for pension
benefits accumulated before the winding-up period.
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If the change of pension structure was mainly driven by cost saving, we should expect a shift from DB pension to
DCpension becauseDCpension is cheaper tomaintain thanDBpension. However, we document a shift ofDBpension
to cash-in-lieu, rather than a shift of DB pension to DC pension. If the change of pension structure was purely driven
by tax treatment, we should expect a decline of DB and DC pension at the same time because the tax treatment is the
same for both DB and DC pension. However, we find that DC pension only started to decline after April 2014 when
AAwas further cut. The main reason is that firms take advantage of AA to exhaust allowance for DC pension. To illus-
trate this with an example: Ian Cheshire, CEO of Kingfisher, received DC pension of £203,000, £205,000, £208,000,
£49,400 and £70,000 in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. These annual DCs are all in line with AA for
their respective years. It suggests that Kingfisher employed DC pension to exhaust its CEO’s AA for each financial
year. Firms appear to awardDCpension to exhaust their CEOs’ AA, and then use cash-in-lieu to top up further benefit.
In short, both tax and cost saving factors influence CEOs’ pension choices. Cash-in-lieu is the most tax efficient and
cheapest to maintain. We witness its strong growth throughout the sample period. On the other hand, DB pension is
not tax efficient. It is also the costliest type of pension tomaintain. It is not a surprise that we findDB pension declines
dramatically. DC pension is cheaper than DB pension to maintain, but it is less tax efficient compared to cash-in-lieu.
Therefore, we only demonstrate a moderate decrease in DC pension in the later stages. All in all, the tax treatment is
a key determinant of CEO pension structure in the UK.
Next, we examine the impact of ex-ante pension value on the change of pension structure.We argue that CEOswith
morepensions should bemore affectedby tax change. Therefore, they should have a stronger incentive to reduce their
pensionafter the reform.To investigate this,wedivide the sample into twogroupsbasedonwhetherCEOsexceedpen-
sion allowances or not. We define high pension group as CEOs who exceed either AA or LTA before the 2006 reform.
As discussed in the introduction, our sample contains a large number of zero value observations, because many CEOs
donot have any insidedebt.We runTobit regressionswith interactive terms inTable 8. The table shows thatCEOswith
a high level of DB pension receive fewer DB pensions after the reform. For instance, the coefficient of After April06×
HighDB_AA is−50.77 in column (3). Such a coefficient suggests that if a CEO exceeds AA before the 2006 reform, his
or herDBpensionas a fractionof total pensiondeclinesby50.77%after the reform.A similar result is alsodocumented
when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of DB pension in columns (1) and (2).
Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that CEOs with a large amount of DB pensions reduce their DB pensions
substantially more after the reform. Table 8 also shows that the magnitude of DB pension reduction depends on ex-
ante pension value, the amount of DB pension prior to pension reform. Since the amount of DB pensions affects the
amount of income taxes that CEOs are liable to pay, these results further strengthen our argument that income tax is
the key driver for the sharp decline of DB pension.
6.2 The impact of CEO pension on firm risk-taking
The previous literature finds that inside debt is negatively associated with a number of firm risk-taking measures, as
summarised in Table 1. If the relationship between inside debt and risk-taking is causal, then we should observe an
increase in risky policies as firms shift away from inside debt compensation in response to the pension reforms. In
Tables 9–12, we present a formal analysis of the association between changes in firm risk-taking and changes in DB
pension that corresponds to our research design. As described in Section 4.2, our research design allows us to exploit
the cross-sectional relation between changes in firm risk-taking and changes in DB pension while controlling omitted
factors that might have affected firm risk policies in the same period. Our test procedure is as follows. For each firm,
we calculate averages of variables in both pre- and post-reform periods. We then calculate the difference between
those two average values for each variable. The newly formed differenced variables are then used in the regressions
of equation5. Since there are twomajor changes to thepension taxes, the2006pension reform that introducesAAand
LTA and the 2011 AA cut that significantly lowers AA, we present results for both regulation changes. Following the
previous literature, we calculate three measures of inside debt. The first inside debt variable is the natural logarithm
1340 LI AND ZHAO
TABLE 8 The impact of pension reform on CEO pension: Comparison between high and lowDB pension groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables DB pension total (ln£000s) DB/Total pension (%)
After Apr06 0.53 0.94 −0.37 3.98
(0.65) (1.14) (−0.04) (0.41)
High DB_AA 12.80*** 144.27***
(11.94) (11.90)
High DB_LTA 12.72*** 141.59***
(11.97) (11.51)
After Apr06* High DB_AA −3.32*** −50.77***
(−2.84) (−3.83)
After Apr06* High DB_LTA −3.84*** −56.74***
(−3.29) (−4.19)
CEO age 5.32** −1.31 2.63 −64.58**
(2.01) (−0.50) (0.09) (−2.12)
CEO tenure −0.71* −0.33 −9.10** −5.45
(−1.81) (−0.84) (−1.99) (−1.18)
Foreign CEO −0.06 −0.45 −3.90 −9.10
(−0.11) (−0.76) (−0.96) (−1.29)
Female CEO 0.56 0.76 −11.25 −10.08
(0.40) (0.55) (−0.66) (−0.58)
CEO equity −0.14 −0.06 −1.42 −0.81
(−0.84) (−0.38) (−0.75) (−0.42)
CEO duality 2.41* 2.62* 46.31****** 48.10***
(1.66) (1.83) (2.91) (2.99)
Board independence −0.13*** −0.14*** −1.39*** −1.54***
(−4.55) (−0.90) (−4.23) (−4.62)
Firm size 1.26*** 1.17****** 13.96*** 13.64***
(5.19) (4.85) (5.00) (4.79)
Market to book ratio 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.48
(0.25) (1.10) (0.47) (1.17)
Leverage 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.56*** 0.64***
(2.94) (3.30) (2.58) (2.89)
ROA 0.01 0.04 −0.01 0.39
(0.11) (1.02) (−0.01) (0.81)
Stock return volatility −0.04** −0.04* −0.42* −0.38*
(−2.14) (−1.91) (−1.93) (−1.72)
Constant −30.09*** −4.36 −114.46 144.69
(−2.81) (−0.42) (−0.94) (−0.94)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports results from Tobit regressions describing the impact of UK pension reforms on CEO pension. The
dependent variables are CEO total DB pension (ln£000s) in columns (1) and (2); and DB/ Total pension (%) in columns (3) and
(4). HighDB_AA (LTA) refers to firmswhoseCEODBpension exceeds the annual allowance (lifetime allowance) prior to 2006.
Among our 1,155 observations, 763 observations are left-censored while 392 observations are uncensored. The asterisks *,
**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Z statistics are reported in parentheses. All other
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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of total DB pension in pounds sterling (Caliskan & Doukas, 2015). It captures the absolute incentive from CEO DB
pension. The second one is the ratio of DB pension to equity incentives (Cassell et al., 2012; Sundaram & Yermack,
2007). It captures the relative incentives of inside debt compared to equity pay. The last inside debt variable is the
relative ratio of DB pension to equity incentives based on firms’ debt-to-equity ratio (Kabir et al., 2013, 2018; Liu
et al., 2014). It captures the trade-off between a CEO’s personal leverage and his or her firm leverage.
In Table 9,we regress changes in firm cash holdings on changes inDBpension,while controlling for firm size,market
to book ratio, firm leverage and operating cash flow. Our sample size is quite small as a firm can only be included if it
has observations both before and after the reform. Our full sample contains 126 unique firms, but only 95 firms have
observations both before and after the 2006 pension reform (97 for the 2011 AA change). We also control for CEO
changes during the reform period. DB pension may change due to CEO turnover, rather than changes in a firm’s com-
pensation policy.22 Thus, six regressions excluding firms that have CEO changes during the reform period are listed in
columns 7–12. For the 2006 pension reform, most coefficients of inside debt variables are insignificant except the DB
to equity relative (column 9) when CEO changes are excluded. Our results are inconsistent with hypothesis H4 and
previous findings documented in the US. Turning to the 2011 AA change (columns 4–6 and 10–12), none of the inside
debt variables is significant.
Table 10 examines the relationship between change in R&D and change in inside debt. The results are similar to
those inTable9.Coefficientsof insidedebt variables areall statistically insignificant.Overall, the results donot support
our hypothesis H3. Table 11 examines the relationship between change in CAPEX and change in inside debt. All inside
debt coefficients are negative, which is in line with the previous literature. However, none of the coefficients of inside
debt is statistically significant. Table12presents the results for the relationshipbetweenchanges in stockvolatility and
changes in inside debt. Similar to the results in Tables 9 and 10, coefficients of inside debt variables are not significant
exceptDB toequity ratio (column8).However, the signof the coefficient is positive andcontradicting toourhypothesis
H3. Therefore, we do not find evidence that firm risk-taking and inside debt are negatively associated.
In summary, our results in Tables 9–12 do not support the risk reduction hypotheses (H3–H4). The change of the
CEO DB pension after the reform does not lead to a change of firm risk-taking. Our results hold for both the 2006
reformand the 2011AAcut. These results are consistent for different proxies of CEODBpension and firm risk-taking.
There is no relationship between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking.
7 ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Our results in Section6differ from theprevious literature documented in theUS. To ensure that our results are robust,
we present additional tests in this section.
7.1 Panel data regression
Following the mainstream research design employed in the literature (summarised in Table 4), we employ fixed-effect
models to directly investigate the relationship between firm cash holdings and CEODBpension.We separate analysis
of cash holdings from the rest of the risk proxies. As discussed previously, cash is the most liquid asset to fund any
pension deficit. Ideally, CEOs should be cautious about cash policy if they have a large amount of pension tied to the
firm. Table 13 presents the regression results of inside debt on cash holdings. Our dependent variable is cash/total
assets.
22 For example,Michael Bailey of Compass Group plc was replaced by Richard Cousins just before the 2006 pension reform at the end of financial year 2005.
At the time of the CEO change, Michael had DB pension of £15million. After the change, Richard does not have any DB pension. A crude difference between
CEODB pension before and after the reform counts this as a change of compensation policy.
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TABLE 13 CEO pension and firm cash holdings: Panel regressions
Panel A: Full sample
Firms fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) −0.023 0.125
(−0.261) (0.652)
DB to equity ratio 0.001 −0.004
(0.191) (−0.618)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.010 0.038
(0.109) (0.368)
CEO equity −0.053 −0.053 −0.053 0.137 0.133 0.137
(−0.382) (−0.367) (−0.371) (0.763) (0.788) (0.763)
CEO duality 1.790 1.789 1.784 2.400 2.406 2.398
(1.458) (1.403) (1.384) (1.151) (1.156) (1.515)
Board independence 0.065** 0.066*** 0.066** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(2.575) (2.589) (2.574) (2.865) (2.881) (2.886)
Firm size −2.786*** −2.831*** −2.822*** −2.175** −2.192** −2.175***
(−3.245) (−3.437) (−3.568) (−2.134) (−2.175) (−2.164)
Market to book ratio 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.013
(0.956) (0.927) (0.920) (0.288) (0.308) (0.312)
Leverage −0.019 −0.019 −0.019 0.003 0.002 0.004
(−0.978) (−0.980) (−0.916) (0.092) (0.074) (0.114)
Operating cash flows 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.231***
(6.067) (6.130) (6.072) (3.942) (3.908) (3.893)
Stock return volatility 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.009 0.008
(1.328) (1.277) (1.317) (0.428) (0.452) (0.403)
R&D expenses 0.307* 0.307* 0.306* 0.150 0.148 0.151
(1.871) (1.872) (1.870) (0.742) (0.734) (0.748)
CAPEX expense 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.016 0.016 0.016
(1.502) (1.486) (1.482) (0.291) (0.298) (0.289)
Dividend payer −2.722*** −2.741*** −2.739*** −4.114*** −4.139*** −4.129***
(−3.567) (−3.550) (−3.549) (−4.772) (−4.791) (−4.762)
Constant 27.51*** 27.81*** 27.73*** 18.85** 19.58** 19.23**
(3.849) (3.977) (4.121) (2.048) (2.255) (2.227)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254
Cross-section F 9.14*** 9.16*** 9.13*** 6.01*** 6.03*** 6.02***
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.623 0.623 0.622
(Continues)
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TABLE 13 (Continued)
Panel B: Subsample
Firmswith pension deficit Firmswith pension surplus
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) −0.137 0.343
(−1.190) (1.046)
DB to equity ratio −0.001 0.011
(−0.278) (0.599)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.029 −0.023
(0.254) (−0.076)
CEO equity 0.016 0.013 0.016 −1.169 −1.009 −0.864
(0.090) (0.074) (0.090) (−1.075) (−0.916) (−0.796)
CEO duality 0.912 0.757 0.889 −11.16*** −11.16*** −11.41***
(0.726) (0.589) (0.682) (−2.664) (−2.722) (−2.789)
Board independence 0.056* 0.059** 0.059** −0.066 −0.057 −0.060
(1.946) (2.046) (2.038) (−0.358) (−0.287) (−0.287)
Firm size −0.507 −0.745 −0.794 −5.245** −5.173** −5.355**
(−0.593) (−0.923) (−1.017) (−2.056) (−2.040) (−2.204)
Market to book ratio −0.001 −0.003 −0.002 0.009 0.006 0.003
(−0.022) (−0.116) (−0.093) (0.152) (0.099) (0.056)
Leverage −0.002 −0.001 0.001 −0.261** −0.265** −0.262**
(−0.079) (−0.045) (0.013) (−2.182) (−2.215) (−2.181)
Operating cash flows 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.244 0.233 0.218
(4.789) (4.840) (4.830) (0.866) (0.835) (0.799)
Stock return volatility −0.008 −0.009 −0.010 0.082 0.077 0.077
(−0.350) (−0.380) (−0.436) (0.918) (0.852) (0.809)
R&D expenses −0.099 −0.100 −0.097 −0.876 −1.427 −1.600
(−0.647) (−0.682) (−0.656) (−0.477) (−0.791) (−0.859)
CAPEX expense −0.064 −0.065 −0.064 0.013 0.011 0.013
(−0.810) (−0.818) (−0.811) (0.181) (0.143) (0.171)
Dividend payer −2.159*** −2.269*** −2.321*** −0.875 −0.741 −0.648
(−2.878) (−3.063) (−3.119) (−0.337) (−0.284) (−0.246)
Constant 9.313 10.969 27.73*** 69.67*** 68.32** 69.07**
(1.275) (1.568) (4.121) (2.891) (2.569) (2.592)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry No No No No No No
Cross-section number 107 107 107 52 52 52
Cross-section F 7.99*** 7.95*** 7.94*** 2.45*** 2.42*** 2.41***
Number of observations 811 811 811 148 148 148
(Continues)
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TABLE 13 (Continued)
Panel B: Subsample
Firmswith pension deficit Firmswith pension surplus
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adjusted R-squared 0.537 0.536 0.536 0.479 0.475 0.473
Notes: Panel A: This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEODB pension and firm cash holdings (Cash/Total
assets). The sample includesUKFTSE100non-financial andnon-utility firms from2003–16. The total number of observations
is 1,155 from 126 unique firms. The dependent variable is firms cash holdings (Cash / Total assets). DB total is the natural
logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity ratio is CEO DB pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s
shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value. DB to equity ratio relative is DB to equity ratio, scaled by a firm’s debt to equity
ratio. Columns (1) to (3) employ firm (number = 126) and year (number = 14) fixed-effect model. Columns (4) to (6) employ
CEO (number = 254) and year (number= 14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard errors that adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel B: Columns (1) to (3) are for observations with pension deficit (pension assets is lower than pension liability) for a given
year. Columns (4) to (6) are for observations with pension surplus (pension assets is larger than pension liability) for a given
year.
As shown in Table 13 Panel A, none of the coefficients on inside debt variables is statistically significant. There is
no association between firm cash holdings and inside debt. In Panel B, we divide our sample into two groups based
on whether firms have pension deficit or surplus. The expectation is that firms with pension deficit should be more
conservative about their cashpolicies. Therefore,CEO insidedebt in these firms should encouragemore cashholdings.
However, we do not see any of these effects in Panel B. All coefficients of inside debt are statistically insignificant.
These results do not support the causal relationship between cash holdings and inside debt.
Table 14 reports the relationship between inside debt and other risk proxies, where dependent variables are R&D
in Panel A, CAPEX in Panel B and stock return volatility in Panel C. To save space, we do not report control variables
results. Panel D summarises all regression results in Tables 13 and 14. As shown, most coefficients of inside debt vari-
ables are statistically insignificant. When they are significant, the sign of the coefficients is opposite to the risk reduc-
tion hypothesis, except for R&D in the CEO fixed-effect model. Overall, Table 14 reinforces our results in Tables 9–12.
There is simply no relationship between inside debt and firm risk-taking.
7.2 2SLS regression
To address endogeneity concerns, we employ the differenced regression of equation (5). These results are already
reported in Tables 9–12. There are also other approaches to mitigate the endogeneity problem, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2. Instrumental variables can be applied to equation (2). Following Cassell et al. (2012) and van Bekkum (2016),
we use CEO age as the instrumental variable and re-run regressions in equation (2). CEO DB pension mechanically
increaseswith CEO age (tenure) which has no direct interactionwith firm policy. The correlationmatrix in Table 5 also
confirms that CEO’s age is positively related to twoDB pension variables at the 1% significance level.
The first-stage and the second-stage results are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 15, respectively. In
panel A, all three CEO DB pension variables are positively related to the instrument, log of CEO age, as expected.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirms that all three DB pension variables are endogenous. In panel B (the second-
stage regression), we use the fitted value of DB pension from Panel A (the first-stage regression) as an independent
variable. CEODB total is not significantly related to firm cash holding, volatility, R&D and CAPEX (columns 1, 4, 7 and
10). DB to equity ratio and DB to equity ratio relative are negatively associated with volatility (columns 5 and 6) and
R&D (columns 8 and 9). These results are consistent with the risk reduction hypothesis. However, these results do not
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TABLE 14 CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Panel regressions
Panel A: Dependent variable=R&D expenses (R&D / sales)
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) 0.022*** 0.019
(2.624) (0.959)
DB to equity ratio −0.001 −0.002*
(−0.930) (−1.797)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.001 −0.023
(0.036) (−0.990)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254
Cross-section F 107*** 107*** 107*** 53*** 53*** 53***
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.935 0.924 0.924 0.924
Panel B: Dependent variable=CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / sales)
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) 0.107*** 0.202
(2.870) (1.021)
DB to equity ratio 0.002 0.001
(0.730) (0.198)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.093** 0.159**
(1.974) (2.551)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254
Cross-section F 30*** 31*** 31*** 15*** 15*** 15***
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.781 0.809 0.809 0.775 0.774 0.775
(Continues)
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TABLE 14 (Continued)
Panel C: Dependent variable= Stock return volatility
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) 0.022 −0.311
(0.159) (−1.111)
DB to equity ratio 0.015 0.063***
(1.519) (3.683)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.029 0.068
(0.186) (0.509)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254
Cross-section F 7.72*** 8.08*** 8.08*** 6.11*** 6.46*** 6.32***
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155
Adjusted R-squared 0.662 0.663 0.662 0.725 0.729 0.725
Panel D: Summary of regression results
DB pension total DB to equity ratio






















Cash holdings (+) No No No No No No
R&D expenses (-) Positive No No Negative No No
CAPEX expenses (−) Positive No No No Positive Positive
Stock return volatility (−) No No No Positive No No
Notes: Panel A: This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension and firm risk-taking proxies. The
sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from 2003–16. The total number of observations is 1,155
from 126 unique firms. DB total is the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity ratio is CEODB pen-
sion total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value. DB to equity ratio relative is DB to
equity ratio, scaled by a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Columns (1) to (3) employ firm (number = 126) and year (number = 14)
fixed-effect model. Columns (4) to (6) employ CEO (number = 254) and year (number = 14) fixed-effect model. P-values are
based on robust standard errors that adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The aster-
isks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in parentheses. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel D: This panel summarises regression results in Panels A, B and C in Table 14 as well as Panel A in Table 13. ‘No’ indicates
that the result is not statistically significant for the level of 10%. ‘Positive’ (‘Negative’) indicates that the result is statistically
significant (10%) and the coefficient is positive (negative).
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TABLE 16 CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Excluding zero value DB pension
Panel A: Dependent variable=Cash holding (Cash / assets)
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) −0.123 −1.111
(−0.589) (−1.016)
DB to equity ratio 0.005 −0.001
(0.753) (−0.043)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.043 0.048
(0.251) (0.260)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adjusted R-squared 0.579 0.580 0.579 0.649 0.646 0.646
Panel B: Dependent variable=R&D expenses (R&D / sales)
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) −0.006 0.010
(−0.202) (0.115)
DB to equity ratio −0.001 −0.001
(−1.304) (−1.632)
DB to equity ratio relative −0.007 −0.020
(−0.682) (−1.175)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adjusted R-squared 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.973 0.973 0.973
(Continues)
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TABLE 16 (Continued)
Panel C: Dependent variable=CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / sales)
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) 0.019 0.729
(0.204) (1.302)
DB to equity ratio −0.004 0.001
(−1.631) (0.462)
DB to equity ratio relative −0.073** 0.048
(−2.266) (0.907)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adjusted R-squared 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.862 0.861 0.861
Panel D: Dependent variable= Stock return volatility
Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DB total (ln£000s) 0.103 −0.040
(0.219) (−0.029)
DB to equity ratio 0.030** 0.069***
(2.049) (4.223)
DB to equity ratio relative 0.137 0.121
(0.845) (0.645)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.716 0.710 0.733 0.750 0.733
(Continues)
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TABLE 16 (Continued)
Panel E: Summary of regression results
DB pension total DB to equity ratio






















Cash holdings (+) No No No No No No
R&D expenses (−) No No No No No No
CAPEX expenses (−) No No No No Negative No
Stock return volatility (−) No No Positive Positive No No
Notes:Panel A: This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEODB pension and risk-taking proxies. The sample
contains 392 observationswith non-zeroDB pension value fromUKFTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from2003–
16. Thedependent variables are firm cashholding, R&D,CAPEXand stock return volatility in PanelsA, B, C andD, respectively.
The independent variables are DB total, DB to equity ratio and DB to equity ratio relative. DB total is the natural logarithm
of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity ratio is CEODB pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock
options and LTIPs holding value.DB to equity ratio relative isDB to equity ratio, scaledby a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Columns
(1) to (3) employ firm (number= 55) and year (number= 14) fixed-effectmodel. Columns (4) to (6) employCEO (number= 89)
and year (number= 14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard errors that adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. t statistics are reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel E: This panel summarises regression results in Panels A, B, C and D. ‘No’ indicates that the result is not statistically
significant at the level of 10%. ‘Positive’ (‘Negative’) indicates that the result is statistically significant (10%) and the coefficient
is positive (negative).
pass the weak instrument test, so our interpretation is limited here. In short, we could not confirm that inside debt
leads to risk-averse policies whenwe use the 2SLS estimation.
7.3 Skewed distribution for DB pension data
In ourUKsample, 66%ofCEOshavenoDBpension at all. Furthermore,DBpension is highly skewed to the rightwhere
a small number of CEOs have a large amount of DB pensions. In the US, Cassell et al. (2012) also find a large number
of firms with zero inside debt. Our results could be driven by a large proportion of zero value DB pension.We employ
Tobit models in Tables 7 and 8 to mitigate such a problem (Brian et al., 2000; Domínguez-Barrero & López-Laborda,
2007).
To further address the skewed distribution of DB pensions, we employ two additional approaches. First, we use
subsample analysis. Following Cassell et al. (2012), we remove all observations with zero value DB pension. Our sam-
ple size falls to 392 from 1,155. Both firm and CEO fixed-effect models are employed in Table 16. Firm cash holdings,
R&D, CAPEX and stock return volatility are examined in Panels A, B, C andD, respectively. In Panel E, we summarise all
regression results. Among all 24 regressions, we only find one regression result that is consistent with the risk reduc-
tion hypothesis. CAPEX is negatively related toDB to equity ratio relative, when a firm fixed-effectmodel is employed
(column 3 of Panel C). For other regressions, the coefficients are either insignificant or opposite to the risk reduction
hypothesis. We do not find convincing evidence to support the risk reduction hypothesis when we exclude all obser-
vations with zero value DB pension.
Our second approach employs DB dummy variable as suggested by van Bekkum (2016). In his sample of US banks,
approximately 20% of CEOs and 40% CFOs do not have any inside debt. This raises the concern of sample selection
bias. He argues that the value of aDBpension aCEO could havemay be discretionary, as CEOs can choose the amount
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of pension contribution every year. A CEO could influence his or her DB pension contribution, based on his or her per-
ception of a firm’s default risk.However, aCEO’s decision to ownDBpension is less discretionary. Therefore, exploring
the effect of whether CEOs have DB pension or not is more appropriate than examining the values of DB pension. In
addition, testing the existence of DB pension rather than the value of DB pensionwould help tomitigate the impact of
skewed distribution. Van Bekkum (2016) creates a dummy variable (CEO_with_inside debt 0/1) for all samples, which
equals one if a CEO has any inside debt and zero otherwise.23 Following van Bekkum (2016), we employ the same
variable of DB dummy in Table 17. The coefficients of DB dummy are not statistically significant for cash holdings and
stock return volatility in all regressions. It suggests that there is no relationship between cash policy, total risk and
existence of DB pension. The coefficients for CAPEX and R&D are positively related toDB dummy, but this is contrary
to our risk reduction hypothesis (H3). Similar to our previous results, we do not find evidence to support that CEODB
pensions lead tomore risk-averse policies.
8 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper provides theUKevidence on the relationship betweenCEO inside debt (in the formofDBpension) and firm
risk-taking. Prior studies conducted in theUS find that inside debt always leads to risk reduction policies, such as a high
level of firmcashholding, a low level of stock returnvolatility andR&Dspending.Weexamine the relationshipbetween
CEODBpension and firm risk-taking byusing twoUKpension changes as exogenous shocks. The2006pension reform
substantially increases the tax cost of pension, and the 2011 allowance cut further increases income tax associated
with pension. Neither of these regulation changes has any direct effect on firm policies.
We employ differenced cross-section regressions, focusing on the change of firm risk-taking after the pension
reforms and the change of CEO DB pension in the same period. If the causal relationship between CEO inside debt
and firm risk-taking is true, we should observe a change of firm risk-taking corresponding to a change of CEODB pen-
sion after the reforms. We find that CEO DB pension decreases dramatically after both reforms. This is consistent
with our tax benefit hypothesis. However, the decline of DB pension does not lead to a corresponding increase in DC
pension. Instead, cash-in-lieu increases substantially. Firms appear to substitute DB pension with cash-in-lieu. CEOs
use pensions to minimise income tax, and they alternate their pensions when tax on pensions changes. However, a
change in CEODBpensions does not lead to any change of firm risk-taking. This is inconsistent with the risk reduction
hypothesis.We do not find that inside debt induces risk-aversemanagerial behaviours.
Our results differ from related studies conducted in the US. There are two possible explanations. First, risk asso-
ciated with CEO pension can be managed or circumvented by top managers in the UK. CEOs have a number of tools
available to influence the payoff of their pensions,which can shield them from firms’ default risk. These options include
earlywithdrawal of pension and transferringpensionout of firms.CEO insidedebtmaybemoreprotectedand secured
than expected by the literature. Second, CEODB pension is used mainly to maximise tax benefit. We show that CEOs
with a high DB pension value would reduce their pensions more after the reform. The pension arrangement may be
structured to avoid income tax, rather thanmoderating a firm’s risk policies.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
REFERENCES
Acharya,V.,Davydenko, S., &Strebulaev, I. (2012). Cashholdings and credit risk.TheReviewof Financial Studies,25, 3572–3609.
Anantharaman,D., Fang, V., &Gong, G. (2014). Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts.Management Science,60,
1260–1280.
23 See Section B ‘CEOs and CFOswith andwithout inside debt’ in van Bekkum (2016) for detailed discussion.
1358 LI AND ZHAO
Anantharaman, D., & Lee, Y. (2014). Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 111, 328–351.
Bebchuk, L., & Jackson, R. (2005). Executive pensions. Journal of Corporation Law, 30, 823–855.
Belkhir, M., Boubaker, S., & Chebbi, K. (2018). CEO inside debt and the value of excess cash. Journal of Applied Accounting
Research, 19, 225–244.
Bennett, R., Güntay, L., & Unal, H. (2015). Inside debt, bank default risk, and performance during the crisis. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 24, 487–513.
Borah,N., James,H., &Park, J. (2020). DoesCEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders anddebtholders?Review
of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 54, 159–203.
Brian, S., Hwang, L., & Lilien, S. (2000). CEO stock-Based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity, relative
mix, and economic determinants. The Journal of Business, 73, 661–693.
Broadbent, J., Palumbo, M., & Woodman, E. (2006). The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans
-Implications for asset al. location and risk management. Working paper. Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/publ/
wgpapers/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf
Caliskan, D., & Doukas, J. (2015). CEO risk preferences and dividend policy decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 35, 18–42.
Cambrea, D., Colonnello, S., Curatola, G., & Fantini, G. (2019). CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm per-
formance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 46, 944–976.
Cassell, C., Huang, S., Sanchez, J., & Stuart, M. (2012). Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the
riskiness of firm investment and financial policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103, 588–610.
Cen, W. (2010). The determinants of CEO inside debt and its components.Working paper. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716306
Chaudhry, N., Au Yong, H., & Veld, C. (2017). Tax avoidance in response to a decline in the funding status of defined benefit
pension plan. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions andMoney, 48, 99–116.
Chi, S., Huang, S., & Sanchez, J. (2017). CEO inside debt incentives and corporate tax sheltering. Journal of Accounting Research,
55, 837–876.
Choy, H., Lin, J., & Officer, M. (2014). Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk? Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 57, 1–21.
Dang, V., & Phan, H. (2016). CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity structure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 70, 38–54.
Deng, K., He, J., Kong, D., & Zhang, J. (2019). Does inside debt alleviate bank’s risk taking? Evidence froma quasi-natural exper-
iment in the Chinese banking industry. EmergingMarkets Review, 40, 100622.
Domínguez-Barrero, F., & López-Laborda, J. (2007). Why do people invest in personal pension plans? Applied Economics, 39,
1115–1126.
Dutordoir, M., Strong, N., & Ziegan, M. (2014). Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance? Journal of
Corporate Finance, 24, 80–100.
Edmans, A., & Liu, Q. (2011). Inside Debt. Review of Finance, 15, 75–102.
Eisdorfer, A., Giaccotto, C., &White, R. (2015). Do corporatemanagers skimp on shareholders’ dividends to protect their own
retirement funds? Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 257–277.
Foley, C., Hartzell, J., Titman, S., & Twite, G. (2007).Why do firms hold somuch cash? A tax-based explanation. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 86, 579–607.
Gerakos, J. (2010). Chief executive officers and the pay–pension tradeoff. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance,9, 303–319.
Goh, L., & Li, Y. (2015). Pensions as a form of executive compensation. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 42, 1154–1187.
Gow, I., Larcker, D., & Reiss, P. (2016). Causal inference in accounting research. Journal of Accounting Research, 54, 477–523.
Han, S., & Qiu, J. (2007). Corporate precautionary cash holdings. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, 43–57.
Harford, J., Klasa, S., &Maxwell,W. (2014). Refinancing risk and cash holdings. The Journal of Finance, 69, 975–1012.
Harford, J., Mansi, S., & Maxwell, W. (2008). Corporate governance and a firm’s cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial
Economics, 87, 535–555.
Hayes, R., Lemmon, M., & Qiu, M. (2012). Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R.
Journal of Financial Economics, 105, 174–190.
He, G. (2015). The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality. Review of Accounting Studies, 20, 501–536.
Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R., & Palia, D. (1999). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link
between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 353–384.
Kabir, R., Li, H., & Veld-Merkoulova, Y. (2013). Executive compensation and the cost of debt. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37,
2893–2907.
Kabir, R., Li, H., & Veld-Merkoulova, Y. (2018). Do managers act opportunistically towards the end of their career? Journal of
International Financial Markets, Institutions andMoney, 56, 218–232.
Lane Clark & Peacock LLP. (2015). LCP FTSE 100 Executive Pensions Survey 2015. Retrieved from https://www.lcp.uk.com/
pensions-benefits/publications/executive-pensions-survey-2015/
LI AND ZHAO 1359
Larcker, D., & Rusticus, T. (2010). On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics, 49, 186–205.
Li, H., Pincus, M., & Rego, S. (2008). Market reaction to events surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and earnings
management. The Journal of Law and Economics, 51, 111–134.
Li,W., Rhee, S., & Shen,C. (2018). CEO inside debt and convertible bonds. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,45, 232–249.
Li, Z., Lin, S., Sun, S., & Tucker, A. (2018). Risk-adjusted inside debt.Global Finance Journal, 35, 12–42.
Li, W., & Young, S. (2016). An analysis of CEO pay arrangements and value creation for FTSE-350 companies. CFA Soci-
ety UK. Retrieved from https://www.cfauk.org/-/media/files/pdf/pdf/9-media-centre/cfa-uk-executive-remuneration-
report_dec2016_finalv6.pdf
Liu, Y., Mauer, D., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt. Journal of Banking and Finance, 42, 83–100.
Low, A. (2009). Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 470–490.
Miller, M., &Orr, D. (1966). Amodel of the demand for money by firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 413–435.
Morris, D., Gregory-Smith, I., Main, B., Montagnoli, A., & Wright, P. (2015). The Impact of ’A - Day’ on Executive Pensions and
Pay for Performance.Working Paper. Retrieved from http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/93185/
Murphy, K. (2012). Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2,
211–356.
OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2013). Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and
G20 indicators. OECD Publication. Retrieved from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/pensions-at-a-
glance-2013_pension_glance-2013-en
OECD (TheOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2019). Pensionmarkets on focus.OECD Publication.
Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Pension-Markets-in-Focus-2019.pdf
Pension Policy Institute. (2003). The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution. Pension Policy Institute Publi-
cation. Retrieved from https://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/research/research-reports/2003/02-07-2003-bn02-
the-shift-from-defined-benefit-to-defined-contribution/
Pension Policy Institute. (2016). The newpensions landscape. Pensions Policy Institute Publication. Retrieved fromhttps://www.
pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/research/research-reports/2016/2016-11-29-the-new-pensions-landscape/
Phan, H. (2014). Inside debt andmergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49, 1365–1401.
Rauh, J. (2006). Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans. The Journal of
Finance, 61, 33–71.
Roberts,M., &Whited, T. (2013). Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance.Handbook of the Economics of Finance,2, 493–572.
Royal London. (2016). Pensions tax relief: Time to end the salami slicing. Royal London Publication. Retrieved from
https://www.royallondon.com/siteassets/site-docs/media-centre/policy-papers/royal-london-policy-paper-time-to-
end-the-salami-slicing.pdf
Sheikh, S. (2019). CEO inside debt, market competition and corporate risk taking. International Journal of Managerial Finance,
15, 636–657.
Srivastav, A., Armitage, S., & Hagendorff, J. (2014). CEO inside debt holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from bank payout
policies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 47, 41–53.
Sundaram, R., & Yermack, D. (2007). Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial compensation. The Journal of Finance,
62, 1551–1588.
van Bekkum, S. (2016). Inside debt and bank risk. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51, 359–385.
Wei, C., & Yermack, D. (2011). Investor reactions to CEOs’ inside debt Incentives. The Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3813–
3840.
Widdicks, M., & Zhao, J. (2014). A model of equity based compensation with tax. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 41,
1002–1041.
How to cite this article: Li H, Zhao J. Inside debt and firm risk-taking: Evidence from the UK pension reform. J
Bus Fin Acc. 2020;47:1316–1364. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12492
1360 LI AND ZHAO
APPENDIX A
Variables Definitions
CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Using DB pension dummy
Panel A: Compensation variables
Variable name Definition
DB pension Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has defined benefit pension,
otherwise zero.
DC pension Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has defined contribution
pension, otherwise zero.
Cash-in-lieu Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has cash-in-lieu pension,
otherwise zero.
DB pension annual The difference between a CEO defined benefit pension’s total transfer value in year t
and that in year t–1, less a CEO’s personal contribution.
DC pension annual CEO annual defined contribution pension grant by the firm.
Cash-in-lieu annual CEO annual cash-in-lieu pension grant by the firm.
Pension annual The sum of DB pension annual, DC pension annual and cash-in-lieu annual.
Annual compensation The sum of CEO salary, bonus, pension, stock options and LTIPs grants during a
particular year.
DB pension total CEO defined benefit pension’s total transfer value.
DB to equity ratio CEO defined benefit pension’s total transfer value scaled by the sum of a CEO’s
shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value.
DB to equity ratio relative DB to equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio.
CEO equity The sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs value.




Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is between August
2004 andMarch 2006, otherwise zero.
Between Apr06 toMar11
(initial introduction)
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is between April 2006
andMarch 2011, otherwise zero.
Between Apr11 toMar14
(a big cut in allowance)
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is between April 2011
andMarch 2014, otherwise zero.
After Apr14
(a further cut in allowance)
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is after 6 April 2014,
otherwise zero.
After Apr06 Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is after 6 April 2006,
otherwise zero.
Panel C: CEO and board characteristics variables
Variable name Definition
CEO age Natural logarithm of CEO age in years.
CEO tenure Natural logarithm of CEO’s years in the job.
Foreign CEO Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO is non-British, otherwise zero.
Female CEO Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO is female, otherwise zero.
CEO duality Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO also holds the position of
chairperson, otherwise zero.
Board independence The number of non-executive directors scaled by the total number of directors.
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Panel D: Firm characteristics variable
Variable name Definition
Cash holdings A firm’s cash holdings scaled by its total assets.
Firm size Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets.
Market to book ratio A firm’s market value of equity scaled by its book value of equity.
Leverage A firm’s total debt scaled by its total assets.
Operating cash flows A firm’s cash flows from operating activities scaled by its total assets.
Stock return volatility The standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock return during a particular fiscal year.
R&D expenses A firm’s research and development expenses scaled by its total sale.
CAPEX expenses A firm’s capital expenditure scaled by its total sale.
Dividend payer Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a firm pays cash dividend, otherwise
zero.
ROA A firm’s EBTDA scaled by its total assets.
APPENDIX B
An example of pension valuation
Following Kabir et al. (2013, 2018), we use hand-collected data from annual reports to estimate CEO DB, DC and
cash-in-lieu. The example is fromKingfisher Plc 2013 Annual Report, where Sir Ian Cheshire is CEO.
Part A: DB pension




















Ian Cheshire 53 14 2 33 32 72 596 519
Notes: DB increment (2013) = Transfer value of DB (2013) − Transfer value of DB (2012) − Personal contribution
= £72,000
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Part B: DC pension and cash-in-lieu
Employer contribution to
defined contribution pension
scheme Cash alternative Total
£000 2012/13 2011/12 2012/13 2011/12 2012/13
Ian Cheshire 7.4 49.4 230.7 156.8 238.1
Notes:DC (2013)= Employer contributions to defined contribution scheme= £7,400
Cash-in-lieu (2013)=Cash alternative= £230,700
Part C: Pension variable construction in empirical analysis
1. Total pension=DB incremental+DC incremental+ cash-in-lieu= 72,000+ 7,400+ 230,700= £310,100
2. DB / total pension= 72,000 / 310,100= 23%
3. DC / total pension= 7,400 / 310,100= 2%
4. Cash-in-lieu / total pension= 230,700 / 310,100= 74%
5. DB total= ln (596,000)= 13.30
6. DB to equity= Transfer value of DB to the estimated value of equity holding= 596,000 / 15,684,211= 3.8%
7. DB to equity relative=DB to equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio= 3.8% / 4.55% 0.84
Part D: Interpretation of pension variables in panel C
In 2013, Kingfisher plc CEO Sir Ian Cheshire had an annual pension of £310,100, including 23% of DB pension, 2%DC
pension and 74% of cash-in-lieu. His 2013 annual pension package was dominated by cash-in-lieu. His DB pension
value is only 3.8% of his equity holding (DB to equity = 3.8%). His personal leverage (DB to equity) is smaller than
Kingfisher’s leverage (firm debt to equity) at 0.84 (DB to equity relative= 0.84).
APPENDIX C
A simple demonstration of 2006 pension reform
Directly comparing pension tax before and after the pension reform is very difficult. This is because tax rules are very
complex and havemultiple layers of special treatments and exceptions. The example we show below is a crude simpli-
fication, but the overall representation is still the same: the 2006 pension reform substantially increases income tax
on pension. This is especially true for CEOs who are not restricted by the pre-2006 Earnings Cap rules but are later
captured by the AA and LTA rules.
The table below reports a simple example related to the 2006 pension reform. All figures are based on a hypothet-
ical CEOwhose pension benefits already exceed the Earnings Cap, AA and LTA in 2006. The £100,000 pay in pension
or cash is on top of the CEO’s other compensation, hence ‘incremental’. In other words, the CEO is subject to both AA
and LTA charge on the pension payment. This is a simplifying assumption as the LTA charge is deducted at source by
the pension administrator and only becomes payable when the benefits received exceed LTA. But the overall message
remains the same; LTA is very expensive for a CEO with a large pension. Income tax rates are based on the tax year
2006/07. Tomake comparison easy to follow, we also assume capital growth is 0%.
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*Based on 1989 occupational pension scheme, employer contributions are tax exempt.
**Earnings Cap can be avoided if the CEO’s pension benefits come from different pension regimes.
***This LTA example is based on technical instruction titled ‘Pension TaxManual’ produced byHMRC. The instruction is avail-
able online at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/pensions-tax-manual/ptm080000
First, a CEO in the pre-2006 era would pay far less income tax on pension. For £100,000 gross pay, a CEOwould be
triple taxed (AA charge, LTA charge and also income tax) and pay 73% in total tax in the post-2006 era. On the other
hand, the same amount of £100,000 gross pay would be only taxed once and pay 40% in total tax in the pre-2006 era.
This is because Earnings Cap rules are laxer in tax reliefs. CEOs have a range of flexibility to manoeuvre incomes to
avoid Earnings Cap.
Second, cash-in-lieu of pension is more tax efficient than DB and DC pension in the post-2006 era. The tax treat-
ment for DB and DC pension is the same in the post-2006 era, so we do not distinguish DB and DC in the above
table. As soon as the CEO’s pension exceeds either AA or LTA, an additional tax bill will be triggered. Cash-in-lieu
of pension, on the other hand, is just normal cash salary with a different name. So it would be taxed as regular
income. Based on the 40% income tax rate, £100,000 incremental pay in cash-in-lieu would generate £60,000 take-
home pay. Therefore, paying cash-in-lieu is far better than paying DB or DC pension in terms of tax treatment in the
post-2006 era.
Third, DB and DC pension are more tax efficient than cash-in-lieu in the pre-2006 era while in both cases,
a CEO would receive £60,000 net of tax for £100,000 incremetal pay. It is still better to be paid in DB or DC
pension as income tax on pension does not arise until a CEO starts receiving benefits. When the capital growth
rate is not zero (we assume 0% for simplification), a CEO would receive even more after-tax pay than the same
amount paid in cash-in-lieu. This may explain why the use of cash-in-lieu is so rare before the 2006 pension
reform.
Finally, Unfunded Retirement Benefit Schemes (UFRBS) and later the Employer Financed Retirement Benefit
Scheme (EFRBS) could be used to avoid AA and LTA. However, rules regarding those schemes are very complex. It
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is also very expensive to run those schemes due to heavy management expenses. Many of those schemes have to use
offshore operation in a different tax jurisdiction to achieve tax efficiency.
In summary, themost tax efficient way in the post-2006 era is awarding CEOswith DB or DC pension up to the AA
and LTA limit. Then CEOs could be paid in cash-in-lieu to top up further benefits. That is why we expect a big increase
in the use of cash-in-lieu, while the decline of DB andDC pension after pension reforms.
